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ABSTRACT 
Cultivating an Ethos of Civility: Good Manners in Castiglione's Book of the Courtier 
Sibbyl Nickerson 
Baldesar Castiglione's Book of the Courtier ventures to give an account of how the 
well-mannered courtier ought to comport himself upon entering into the company of others. 
The text has alternately been received as one which presumes to delineate the methods of 
instantiating an idealized principality; or as one which fatuously lauds the merits of form for 
form's sake; or as a text that cynically espouses the political merits of deceptively pleasing 
manners. A great deal of attention has been also paid to the interlocutor's treatment of the 
relationship between the courtier and his prince. I propose that the text's treatment of good 
manners is best understood as an ethical and political consideration of the meaning and aims 
of pleasing behaviour. In this vein, I identify the author's reliance upon Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics and refer to this text's treatment of the virtues of "friendliness," 
"truthfulness" and wit to develop an understanding of the principles which underpin and 
inform Castiglione's treatment of pleasing words and deeds. Ultimately, I propose that The 
Book of the Courtier implicitly recognizes the merits of cultivating an ethos of civility at 
court and suggest that this ethos can fruitfully help guide civil courtiers in their relations with 
one another as well as their prince. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Baldesar Castiglione's Book of the Courtier recounts a series of four nightly 
dialogues between several courtiers to Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino. The 
expressed aim of these dialogues, according to Federico Fregoso, is to form "in words a 
perfect Courtier, setting forth all the conditions and particular qualities that are required 
of anyone who deserves this name."1 Over the course of their discussions, Castiglione's 
interlocutors give special regard to the correct and pleasing manners which the good man 
at court ought to adopt. Castiglione's assiduous treatment of good form, however, has 
left him open to accusations of ethical and political vacuity: The Courtier has long been 
read as a text which makes manifest the intrinsic frivolity of court interactions and of the 
courtier himself. J. R. Woodhouse reminds us that 
Ever since it had circulated in manuscript form, the Cortegiano had been most highly valued for 
the more superficial techniques described in Books I, II and III. Since its publication (until the 
present day, indeed) many influential writers have adversely criticised its shallowness. Castiglione 
had succeeded so well in sweetening the pill of his didactic purpose that only the sweetness came 
eventually to be considered. The huge audience that his book subsequently reached was more 
intellectually attuned to court fripperies than to the tougher austerity of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
for it is to Aristotle that Castiglione looks for his most important advice [i.e., on how the Courtier 
ought to educate his Prince].2 
While Woodhouse's comments focus our attention on the ethical and political 
possibilities of the text, they also insinuate that the decorous practices investigated in its 
first three books are merely ornamental until they are joined to Ottaviano Fregoso's 
discussion of the courtier as preceptor in Book IV.3 This assumption compels us to 
consider two important and related questions: first, are we justified in thinking that the 
earliest three dialogues afford the reader little more than an eloquent but prescriptive 
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technical guide to the development of refined courtly etiquette? Second, are we justified 
in limiting our efforts to discover the ethical and political import of this text by 
exclusively focusing our attention on the courtier's relationship to his prince? 
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, it seeks to explore the meaning 
and aims of the good manners set forth by Castiglione's interlocutors throughout the text: 
in this vein, we will consider the possibility that Castiglione's espousal of good manners 
in the earliest dialogues reflects an ethical concern with right action in common court 
situations. Second, this study seeks to examine the ways in which the courtier's 
cultivated manners might impact upon his ability to negotiate a myriad of court 
relationships: we will consider how and why the civilized courtier's seemly behaviour 
might allow him to interact with and significantly affect other courtiers as well as his 
prince. 
The first chapter begins by investigating several disparate readings of The 
Courtier and of Castiglione's pivotal treatment of good manners. We focus on three 
analyses in particular which serve as theoretical backdrops for our own investigation: the 
first analysis describes Castiglione as advocating an idealized aesthetic which he 
ostensibly found to be in evidence at Urbino; the second construes Castiglione as 
recommending the practice of indiscriminately conforming to current courtly manners; 
and the third portrays Castiglione as advocating, tout court, the merits of cunning deceit 
in those pleasing displays which the courtier is pressed to adopt. Instead, I suggest that 
the text's treatment of good manners is best understood by considering the ethical as well 
as the political import of pleasing behaviour. I identify the author's reliance upon 
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Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and refer to this text to develop an understanding of the 
principles which underpin and inform Castiglione's treatment of civil actions. Ultimately, 
I propose that The Book of the Courtier implicitly recognizes the merits of cultivating an 
ethos of civility at court. 
The second chapter takes up an examination of the qualities that can be ascribed 
to civility and the role which good manners play in fostering ethical consociationalism. 
Civility, in this case, is related to the triad virtues of "friendliness," "truthfulness," and 
wit as they are discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics. By examining these virtues and 
their corresponding vices, we come to learn something of the character of the virtuously 
civil and the viciously uncivil man. In particular, we can more carefully distinguish 
between the animus and aims of the courtier and the flatterer who both seek to adopt a 
pleasing mien in their courtly interactions. 
Expanding on this analysis, the third chapter addresses the courtier's relations 
with other men at court. The courtier — who must always be prudent in suiting his 
actions to his company — must be able to correctly appraise himself and others while 
also being able to understand how others appraise him in turn. We come to see that the 
cultivation of good manners allows the courtier to maintain his position at court, but it 
also allows him to form salutary friendships with other men of worth and to negotiate 
dangerous enmities within the court. 
The fourth chapter turns to an analysis of the courtier's relationship to his prince. 
Here we see that the courtier's appraisal of his prince's character is crucial in deciding 
how the he will come to serve his ruler. Should the courtier find himself in the service of 
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a beneficent or educable prince, then he will direct his actions towards ameliorating and 
preserving the existing regime; should he find himself in the service of an inveterate 
tyrant, however, then he might find himself compelled to direct his actions towards the 
destruction of the regime. In each case, the good manners that the courtier displays in the 
company of his prince will take on a different quality according to the political aims he 
identifies. 
In our concluding chapter I will revisit this analysis to argue that the courtier's 
good manners find their most meaningful and useful expression when they are 
inextricably tied to ethical and political considerations of the right ends of civility. In 
short, the courtier's cultivation of his own good manners might alternately help him to 
preserve a passively defensive posture or to obscure an actively offensive position, yet 
they might also foster the good will between men of worth which allows the courtier to 
forge good friendships and useful political alliances. We, no less than the courtier 
himself, must consider the content and aims of his refined manners if we are to 
understand the courtier's character and his position and role within the court. 
4 
1. Baldesar Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans. Charles Singleton, ed. Daniel Javitch (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2002), 19. 
2. J. R. Woodhouse, Baldesar Castiglione: A reassessment of The Courtier (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1978), 143. 
3. Ibid., 143 -145. Woodhouse goes on to write that 
Speculation will inevitably continue on Castiglione's purpose, not only in writing Book IV, but in 
compiling the whole treatise. It would be wrong, whatever one's solution to the problem, to 
declare dogmatically that he had any one purpose in writing. It was, yes, an attempt at recording 
for posterity the idyll at Urbino; it was a means of fashioning an ideal of courtly behaviour, at the 
superficial level of Books I-III; and it was an attempt to give a purpose to that perfection of court 
life, namely to influence one's political master. [...] Without the final cause [of influencing one's 
political master] the courtier's purpose would be unfulfilled, just as the prince's role, without his 




THE MEANING OF MANNERS IN THE BOOK OF THE COURTIER 
In his effort to give an account of the excellent courtier, Castiglione assembles a 
company of diversely accomplished men who are themselves described as representing 
"the most excellent of every kind of talent that could be found in Italy."1 Castiglione's 
company includes military experts (e.g., Pietro Monte), diplomats (e.g., Ludovico da 
Canossa, Niccolo Frisio), poets and artists (e.g., Giuliano de' Medici, Unico Aretino) and 
future ecclesiasts (e.g., Federico Fregoso, Pietro Bembo). Under the auspices of Duchess 
Elisabetta Gonzaga and signora Emilia Pia, these and other interlocutors devote the next 
four of their nightly discussions to their new enterprise: the immediate two-fold purpose 
of the interlocutor's exchanges is to debate and discover the constituent qualities of the 
worthy courtier and to distinguish these from the qualities possessed by pretenders to 
good courtiership.2 Early in the endeavour, Count Ludovico da Canossa identifies a 
ruling quality which must guide the worthy courtier's actions: "in all human affairs 
whether in word or deed," Ludovico tells us 
[the courtier ought to] avoid affectation in every way possible as though it were some very rough 
and dangerous reef; and [he ought to] practice in all things a certain sprezzatura [non-chalance], so 
as to conceal all art and make whatever is done or said to appear to be without effort and almost 
without any thought about it. And I believe much grace comes of this: because everyone knows 
the difficulty of things that are rare and well done; wherefore facility in such things causes the 
greatest wonder; whereas, on the other hand, to labor and, as we say, drag forth by the hair of the 
head, shows an extreme want of grace, and causes everything, no matter how great it may be, to be 
held in little account.3 
This imperative informs the interlocutors' subsequent dialogues and focuses our attention 
on central qualities which attend the practice of good courtiership: the good courtier must 
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display an easy and pleasing manner in all he undertakes, he ought to undertake actions 
which evince his own excellence and he must be solicitous of others' esteem. 
The interlocutors' imaginative formation of a well-mannered courtier has been 
subject to several disparate readings. Occasionally, Castiglione has been understood as 
composing an idealized panegyric for the court of Urbino's past excellence, with some 
pointing to his epistolary mention of the great felicity that accompanied the duchy's men 
during Guidobaldo's rule as evidence for the text's commemorative function.4 According 
to this conception, the imagined courtier commensurately personifies those ideal 
characters the young Castiglione knew and loved during his tenure at the idyllic court of 
Urbino. Consequently, some have been tempted to dismiss the text as a sentimental 
evocation of a lost past on the part of an aging courtier — the author's own expressed 
ambivalence towards nostalgic idealism notwithstanding.5 Idealizing analyses also tend 
to rest upon the identification of a crucial dissonance in the fourth book of The Courtier. 
It is suggested that this book — wherein Ottaviano crowns the imagined courtier with "a 
greater perfection" than has hitherto been ascribed to him6 and Bembo attains an ecstatic 
vision of the mysteries of Love7 — reveals Castiglione's superseding purpose in 
composing the dialogue. From this perspective, the formal structure of the text is seen as 
synchronous with a Ficinian Platonism which deems Aristotelian thought to be 
propaedeutic to an understanding of higher, esoteric Platonic thought: for Ficino, 
Aristotle's natural philosophy was valued as the pathway to the ascendent, soul-purifying 
o 
philosophy of Plato. To linger with Aristotle, then, is to remain stultified; to return to 
Aristotle after having achieved Platonic wisdom is to retrogress. Ultimately, according to 
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this schema, the political duty of the illuminated Platonic philosopher is to instantiate 
good governance. Those who read The Courtier as an ascendant text in the Ficinian 
Platonic style, then, tend to see its first three books as merely preparatory for the Platonic 
dialogue set out in the fourth book. 
Joseph Falvo, for example, argues that Castiglione's portrait of the courtier offers 
an amplified reflection of the excellence of Urbino: the effect of this glorified portraiture 
is to paint Guidobaldo and Elisabetta as good shepherds who, by their preeminently 
virtuous and benificent actions, merit the dutiful service of their excellent courtiers.10 
Politically, Castiglione is seen as lauding a hierarchy of mastery equivalent to "Plato's 
ideal society where power is created and justified through the fiction of a cosmic 
hierarchy [and where the] noble and wise should be leader over those who are inferior of 
birth and uneducated."11 In this cosmology, the role of the courtier is to serve as the 
quasi-divine prince's aide in establishing a rightly-ordered nation.12 Jacob Burckhardt 
equates Castiglione himself with the perfect Courtier — or with a man so self-sufficient 
and complete in his virtue that no court or prince could be equal to his great 
magnanimity.13 Burckhardt ascribes particularly apolitical aims to the text when he 
elevates and divorces the fourth book, with its "magnificent praise of ideal love," from 
the discussion which precedes it.14 As the supremely virtuous man, the courtier is 
ultimately described as the most fit and least inclined to rule: consequently, his final 
efforts are not directed towards service to the prince but towards spiritual self-
perfection.15 In this vein, the more contemporary Wayne Rebhorn attributes distinctly 
metaphysical ends to Castiglione's endeavour. The Book of the Courtier itself, he argues, 
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serves to memorialize and enshrine the excellence of Urbino as a moral reference point 
for future generations.16 While the preponderance of the text is devoted to a lilting but 
problematic imagining of the courtier's worldly qualities, for Rebhorn this is only a 
prelude to Bembo's final rapture which breaks from what has come before and recasts the 
courtier "as a mystic lover seeking self-transformation into pure spirit."17 Once Bembo's 
recitative ecstasy has passed, Urbino is refigured as a harmonious court bound together by 
a transcendent love rather than by the courtiers' willful efforts to achieve some measure 
of consonance.18 
If we read The Book of the Courtier as a text primarily concerned with leading its 
readers to the apprehension and uncritical acceptance of a recondite ideal, its import for 
political action becomes highly limited. On one hand, if the chief purpose of the dialogue 
is to transform the courtier into a spiritual seeker, the text becomes a primarily 
pneumatological treatise whose political aims are suppressed or overturned by the 
metaphysical truths it addresses. On the other hand, if the chief purpose of the dialogue is 
to describe a programme for instantiating the perfect Courtier operating within the perfect 
Regime, then Castiglione seems to have set his readers off in chase of a political ignis 
fatuus. At the very least, it would become difficult for his audience to identify a principle 
of action which allowed for fruitful political engagement in a less-than-perfect regime. 
At worst, his readers might think themselves impelled to direct all and every action 
toward the creation of an apolitical Utopia characterized by beneficently masterful rule. If 
the singular pith of Castiglione's argument resides in a Ficinian plan for perfecting the 
courtier and his court, then the author reveals his remarkable innocence of the mundane, 
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limited condition of man and politics: as Hankins observes, "what is striking, indeed, 
about Ficino's reading of the Republic [. . .] is his lack of skepticism — compared with 
Plato himself— about the possibility of using philosophical wisdom in the 'real' world 
of politics and government."19 More pressing than this is Ficino's lack of skepticism 
about the plausibility of purifying the soul and attaining perfect wisdom. If the 
plausibility of this final resolution is open to doubt and if Book IV is understood as an 
unqualified advocacy of this resolution, then the entire political salience of Castiglione's 
endeavour comes into question. If The Courtier is in fact consonant with a Ficinian 
Platonism then we are likely justified in loosing Book IV from its earlier textual 
moorings: however, by shunting the text's first three books aside and by predicating our 
analysis on a supposition that the text's true import lies in the uncritical assimilation of an 
ideal elucidated in Book IV, we risk occluding its practicable consequences for our daily 
political judgments and actions. 
While it is not certain that we can justify such an occlusion, an attempt to salvage 
the text's more practicable political tenets is no less fraught with difficulty. In some cases 
— occasionally with the help of reductive editing — The Courtier has been rendered a 
practical and prescriptive manual of civility and formal etiquette. As a court 
functionary, the courtier operated in an environment where the private commitments of 
the prince and the public exigencies of political governance were deeply intertwined. 
As a result, "public administration was not separated from the private household of the 
ruler; loyalty was focused on a man, not an institution; and the ruler-by-passed the system 
whenever he wished to grant favour to a suitor. In appointments and promotions, the 
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prime necessity was the prince's favour." Not unreasonably, this description of the court 
focuses upon the lawlessness or potential lawlessness of political activity under the rule 
of a monarch. Indeed, Hale tells us that by 1604, some seventy-five years after The 
Courtier's first publication, "Castiglionesque behaviour had become in some circles a 
byword for place-seeking and a socially divisive code of manners."23 Given the text's 
focus on mannered displays it is not difficult to see why it would be plumbed for 
practicable details about correct behaviour at court and read with an eye to describing the 
possibilities of profitable courtiership under the auspices of a powerful and capricious 
prince. Where the eminently powerful prince's personal and political prerogatives 
determined how actions were to be undertaken at court, the sensible courtier soon learned 
to follow his prince's lead.2 The sensible courtier, in other words, did well to act in 
accordance with the existing mores of courtly behaviour: when operating within a highly 
prescribed code of courtly etiquette, any deviation from this code could displease the 
prince and be detrimental to a courtier's station and opportunity for advancement.25 By 
meticulously adhering to a code of conduct, the courtier could signal his obeisance to his 
prince and to existing court structures. There is also an element of self-aggrandizement 
informing the practice of good courtly form: if the court served as a shining specimen of 
civilized life, the well-mannered courtier stood elevated above and contradistinguished 
Oft 
from the rude masses and their mundane lives. It is suggested that to reenforce his 
claim to political supremacy the courtier had to act with sprezzatura if he was to elide the 
cultivated quality of his actions and suggest his inborn excellence: according to this 
conception, sprezzatura was advocated "to imply the natural or given character of one's 
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social identity, and to deny any earnedness [sic], any labor or arrival from a social 
elsewhere."27 By mastering a courtly code of manners the sensible courtier could both 
preserve the favour he enjoyed from his prince and preclude the competitive intrusion of 
ambitious commoners into his court. 
If we read The Book of the Courtier as little more than a prescriptive guide to 
formal etiquette, however, we risk rendering Castiglione's courtier culturally ornamental 
and politically effete. Indeed, for Victoria Kahn, the courtier's allegiance to empty 
aesthetic form signals his conscious and submissive retreat from active political life.28 
The fatuously polite courtier is relieved of any political impetus to deliberate, decide or 
act as he is reduced to the status of a comely but ineffectual placeholder. In an effort to 
return political agency to Castiglione's courtier, some have sought to attribute the 
qualities of guileful or cynical deceit to the concept of sprezzatura. It has been argued 
that Castiglione, far from vacuously lauding the aesthetic merits of good form, deplored 
the excessive vanity and frivolity of the court which he saw as a catalyst for the decline of 
the Italian city-state's power. Following on the idea of the lawlessness of political life 
under an autocratic ruler, the man of the court is often seen as engaged in a permanent 
and undiscriminating struggle against his peers for the recognition of their prince. To 
persevere in his struggle he must involve himself in the constant process of winning 
favour for himself through an exaggerated display of his personal merits. Consequently, 
Castiglione has been associated with Machiavelli as a political theorist who was primarily 
concerned with the benefits which might come from seeming rather than being or, in 
other words, from being "all show and no substance."30 Virginia Cox argues that since the 
12 
courtier is inescapably exposed to and dependent upon the vicissitudes of courtly 
approbation — and since he is far from certain to meet with praise and advancement even 
if he is perfectly well-behaved — he must at least be willing to consider abandoning the 
principles which might guide his pleasing actions if these principles stand in the way of 
his political success.31 Despite its pretence to ethical seriousness, Cox asserts that the text 
comes dangerously close to providing a morally neutral science of human behaviour, in which 
virtue is effectively replaced by the ability to simulate virtue. It never quite comes to this, of 
course: Fregoso continues to insist [. . .] that the courtier should actually be virtuous as well as 
appearing so. But his emphasis on techniques of manipulating appearances is such that, without 
compromising himself, he provides all the necessary hints for one less scrupulous than himself— a 
Machiavelli, or a Iago [sic] — to develop into a fully-fledged art of simulation.32 
For Harry Berger, Jr. the courtier's conspicuous mastery of a deceptive sprezzatura is a 
boon in itself because it signals his own merit as an artful deceiver: the courtier's pleasing 
and graceful manners act as a foil to his true nature and convey the clear impression to his 
prince that "the ambition and aggressiveness the courtier pretends to mask is really there 
and available for his prince's use."33 This quality of manly aggressiveness, he suggests, 
would elevate the masterful courtier and render him politically useful to Italian princes 
who were often beleaguered by martially superior outside forces.34 John White, however, 
criticizes Castiglione for his focus on the merits of seeming rather than being. For White, 
a politically destabilizing and ethically barren relativism precedes the judgment that every 
action ought to be measured only according to its immediate, often self-serving, utility.35 
Dismissing the ethical and moral tone of Book IV as a logical and textual aberration,36 he 
suggests that the courtier's focus on seeming to the exclusion of being renders him 
indiscriminately serviceable to any prince, even the tyrannical one.37 For Daniel Javitch, 
however, deception is intimately tied to the ethical and political aims described in Book 
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IV. Javitch refutes the idea that the qualities ascribed to the courtier are shaped by and 
meant to appeal to courtiers themselves.38 Instead, Castiglione's interlocutors are 
compelled by the demands of the lawless tyrant to imagine a deceptively pleasing courtier 
who can insinuate himself into the tyrant's good graces with the hopes of thereby leading 
him to virtuous rule.39 He finishes by acknowledging that 
we, as modern readers, may feel dismayed by the growing sense that most of the beautiful manners 
advocated in the book are made necessary by the loss of sincerity and free expression, by the 
sycophancy and servitude that individuals are made to bear in a despotic political system. Yet in 
the sixteenth century, when autocratic rule gained such ascendance in Europe, when despotic 
courts became the centers of power and fashion, was it not precisely because Castiglione provided 
an ideal of artful behaviour tailored to suit the dictates of such institutions that readers found his 
book so pertinent and instructive?40 
Javitch's own deep scepticism about the educatory possibilities open to the courtier, 
however, seems to reverse the idea that the dialogues are pertinent and instructive for the 
courtier who seeks to become a politically active court agent:41 the text's most prominent 
feature, according to this read, seems to be its quiet, plaintive and impotent lament for the 
political conditions which necessitate the courtier's subterfuge. 
While in some cases the deceptively pleasing courtier appears to gain some 
measure of agency for himself, a number of problems emerge from this reading. First, if 
the exigencies of sprezzatura merely compel the courtier to behave with deceptive 
pleasingness in order to win his prince's favour, then the interlocutor's task seems to be 
one of imagining a utile but indiscriminate servant. This courtier ends by achieving little 
more agency than the complacently servile courtier: he renders himself conspicuous to his 
prince but, in the end, becomes nothing more than a potentially useful tool. In this vein, it 
remains unclear why the courtier would wish to make use of the favour he has won to 
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lead the tyrannical prince to more lawful rule: having secured his place as an instrument 
to the prince, the courtier becomes aimless in his actions except where they are directed 
to maintaining favour or fulfilling his prince's will. Indeed, according to this reading, it 
seems unlikely that the deceptive courtier has any basis upon which he can judge the 
lawfulness of his own or his prince's actions. Neutered and lawless, the deceptive 
courtier cuts a less than striking figure. This reading also sharply circumscribes the 
political applicability of the text. Fine manners, cultivated with the sole intent to deceive, 
only treat a peculiar relationship between the deceptive courtier and the lawless prince 
which is not readily translated to other relationships within the court: for example, if 
sprezzatura aims only at the acquisition of a talent for deception, Castiglione would 
appear to have very little to say to the courtier who finds himself in the service of a 
beneficent prince. 
In fact, we can better understand the political import of sprezzatura if we first 
consider its ethical import. Albert Menut observes that The Book of the Courtier draws 
heavily upon Aristotle's ethical thought: over the course of their dialogues, Castiglione's 
interlocutors invoke and discuss several virtues of character and thought as they are laid 
out in The Nicomachean Ethics?2 In this case, however, we might suggest that Aristotle 
is not propaedeutic to the study of Plato, but is rather in accord with Platonic thought.43 
Hankins observes that Castiglione was informally, eclectically, yet thoroughly, educated 
in a number of schools of philosophy — particularly those dealing with Aristotelian and 
Platonic thought.44 While it is highly unlikely that Castiglione could have been innocent 
of Ficinian Platonism, the customarily heterodox nature of his education might suggest to 
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us that he was less indebted to this school of thought than the myth of the monolithic and 
exclusive Florentine academy would lead us to believe.45 Indeed, it has been plausibly 
proposed that each of the four nights of Castiglione's dialogue corresponds to each of 
Aristotle's causes46 and that Book IV of The Courtier is actually devoted to exploring 
Aristotelian precepts which are concordant with Platonic precepts.47 While Hankins 
argues that Castiglione's use of both Aristotelian and Platonic precepts in The Book of the 
Courtier reveals his sympathies with a Ficinian form of concordist thought,48 it is far 
from certain that Castiglione intended to subsume Aristotelian thought to Platonic 
thought in his text. It is not, then, insignificant that Ottaviano speaks of Aristotle and 
Plato together as though they were in consonance in their understanding of perfect 
courtiership.49 
The ascendant tone of the text and Bembo's rapture notwithstanding, it becomes 
difficult to rend the latter part of The Courtier from that which precedes it if we 
understand that its parts form an integral whole: in other words, if the Aristotelian virtues 
which are elucidated in the earlier books are not subordinate but integral to the last, more 
explicitly Platonic book of The Courtier, we need not consider ourselves stultified or 
retrogressive if we linger or return to these earlier parts once we have come to understand 
Book IY. It also becomes difficult to contend that the exclusive pith of the text lies in 
Ottaviano's perfecting of the Courtier and his formation of the magnanimous Prince or in 
Bembo's transcendent, mystic rapture. While the point may seem a fine one, one 
significant consequence arises from this. If we cannot justify a tendency toward textual 
disjunct which denigrates the importance of the earlier books of the text, neither can we 
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justify a single-minded focus on the final aims described by Castiglione in the final book 
of the text: we do not simply end our task by understanding and then instantiating the 
perfect Courtier and by forming the magnanimous Prince or just Regime, but must 
instead return to evaluate and reevaluate what we know of courtiership and the 
possibilities associated with action in view of this understanding. Indeed, a skepticism 
characterized by fear and hope underpins the final dialogue concerning the formation of 
the courtier and his prince. Here, Ottaviano finds himself situated between the notably 
skeptical Frisio — who expresses his fear that "like the Republic of Plato [. . .] we shall 
never see the like of [the magnanimous Prince], unless in heaven perhaps"50 — and the 
notably credulous Ludovico who expresses his earnest hopefulness that such a prince 
might arise in the courts of his acquaintance.51 Ottaviano strikes a balance between the 
two: 
We can still hope for things to come to pass which are possible, even though they may be difficult. 
Thus, in our time we shall perhaps yet see him on earth: for, although the heavens are so chary of 
producing excellent princes that one is scarcely seen in many centuries, such good fortune might 
befall us.52 
Here, the ascent of the courtier to perfection only sees its completion in the instantiation 
of the magnanimous Prince and the just Regime through the caprices of fortune. As 
Lawrence Lipking observes, 
like the courtiers of Urbino themselves, the fictive courtier of whom they speak is peculiarly 
composed of real and ideal, of incredible virtues set against practical limitations. [. . .] Ideals, if 
they are to have any utility, must be tested against the nature of the world as it is, and in that test 
reveal the truth of their claims on our conscience; in dreams begin responsibilities. Just as the The 
Courtier [sic] balances a past society against our present knowledge of its passing, so it balances 
the perfection of courtiership against our knowledge of its possibilities in life.53 
A recognition that the interlocutor's task is always informed by a pragmatic concern with 
action seems to rescue the text from accusations of idealistic political flaccidity and 
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suggests the necessity of reading and rereading the text as an integral whole. 
Castiglione's interlocutors' actions are not limited to wishing, however. As 
Ottaviano's reply to Frisio and Ludovico suggests, it is fitting to identify and aim at good 
outcomes even when we understand that we are limited — if only by the caprices of 
fortune — in our ability to enact these outcomes. Castiglione's interlocutors seek to 
describe the qualities of character which describe good and bad courtiers but, more than 
this, they fashion the courtier — as the courtier must fashion himself — in accordance 
with that "instructed reason [which is] necessary to any man who will consciously shape 
himself or another to fit a role."54 Eduardo Saccone, discussing Castiglione's multiple 
uses of the word "grace," notes that the courtier must act with grace (that is, engage in 
pleasing behaviour) in order to win grace (that is, to cause others to react by praising or 
honouring him): more importantly, he notes that the grace the courtier displays is not 
limited to winning a vertical dispensation of grace from the prince to the courtier but 
must also be cultivated horizontally with the aim of winning praise and honour from his 
courtly peers.55 If we consider the courtier's actions with an eye to Aristotle's ethical 
thought, however, these actions seem not to be undertaken with the unqualified aim of 
achieving praise and honour — though these are far from inconsequential to Castiglione's 
aims or to Aristotelian thought — but with the aim of discovering how the courtier might 
judge himself and others in order to best govern himself within the court. The courtier, in 
other words, does not please for the sake of pleasing, or win praise for the sake of praise 
but instead seeks to please and win praise virtuously: his words and deeds are enacted "at 
the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the 
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right way." This suggests that the courtier's actions are not simply undertaken with the 
single aim of achieving dominance or ascendancy over all other men at court, but that he 
must be in a position to deliberate about his own and others' characters in order to direct 
his actions rightly. Saccone, however, draws a direct correspondence between 
sprezzatura and Socratic irony as Aristotle addresses it his treatment of the virtue of 
truthfulness; he writes that Castiglione means to instruct the great Courtier in the art of 
ironic self-deprecation which is meant to palliate the many and to be understood as a 
consciously deceptive form of understatement by the courtier's equals.57 Saccone cites 
Aristotle's ostensibly unequivocal condemnation of boastfulness and refers to his 
ambiguous attitude toward ironic self-deprecation as a lesser deviation from the virtue of 
truthfulness. Like the magnanimous man, the courtier finds himself in a position of 
being truthful with his equals but when he comes to deal with the many he will tend more 
toward a dissimulative depreciation of his own qualities in order to form a pleasing 
impression in their minds.59 Courtiers are unified in their mutual understanding of each 
others' deception — they will understand that this self-depreciation is meant to highlight 
the courtier's actual greatness rendering the proper recognition of sprezzatura as "the test 
the courtier must pass in order to be admitted to this club, to obtain the recognition of his 
peers" It is only those who lack the discernment to understand the courtier's 
dissimulation who will be deceived and excluded "from the club of the happy few."61 
Jennifer Richards replies that Castiglione's treatment of the courtier's sprezzatura 
is more ambiguous than Saccone allows: she observes that what might be taken for 
aristocratic irony in some parts of the text might also be taken as a fitting "modest or 
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humble demeanour" in others. If Socratic irony proper does have a place in 
Castiglione's text, however, it is in the interlocutors own discussion of sprezzatura itself: 
in particular, Ludovico and Federico's discussion of the necessity of native nobility and 
the seemingly deceptive qualities of imitation are intended to gradually and quietly signal 
their opposite points to the reader: in other words, while seeming to laud born nobility 
and deceptive imitation, the interlocutors intend to impart the understanding that nobility 
can be acquired through practice63 and that imitation is to be understood as the earnest 
attempt to thoroughly assimilate another's partial or complete virtue.64 Indeed, the very 
suggestion that the courtier must engage in right and pleasing actions with a mien of 
effortlessness suggests that he is not yet blessed with complete virtue. In this case, the 
quality of effortless non-chalance which Ludovico early on ascribes to the courtier 
suggests the nascent quality of his virtue: though his actions aim at the right things, he is 
under the constant challenge of having to evaluate and cultivate his understanding of right 
action. Sprezzatura, or the apparent effortlessness of his actions, seems to signal his 
voluntary, decisive and deliberative effort to habituate himself to right action: in other 
words, the courtier having identified a good mode of action seeks to act successfully in 
accordance with that mode of action. These chosen actions become displays which help 
to reveal the orientation of his character to other observers: that he signals a facility with 
these actions suggests that he wishes to achieve and to be associated with a virtue that he 
does not yet possess in the round. As Marcel Tetel observes: 
On the surface, Castiglione's notion of sprezzatura borders on hypocrisy, but in fact it assumes that 
nothing is natural [i.e., innate] to a man who acquires and assimilates fully learned and complete 
attributes by acting them out repeatedly. This repetitive action naturalizes the acquired attribute 
and transforms it into a completely learned skill. Such an aesthetics of negligence does not spring 
forth from a yearning for facility or necessarily as a reaction to simplicity but on the contrary from 
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a conviction [. . .] that a greater challenge for order and harmony is created when one starts from 
an apparent disorder and that order and harmony eventually emanate from a culmulative and 
converging process and not from the imitation of an absolute model. [. ..] Nonchalance then is a 
means of self-challenge and of challenging others; in the process it exposes an oscillation between 
sincerity and gamesmanship in order to sharpen, not define, meaning.65 
In this case, Castiglione is less intent upon cultivating seeming at the expense of being 
and more intent on cultivating seeming as a part of the deliberate and active process of 
coming-to-be. As Aristotle reminds us in his discussion of habituation, "[actions in 
accord with virtue] are not only the sources and causes both of the emergence and growth 
of virtues and of their ruin; the activities of the virtues [once we have acquired them] also 
consist in these same actions."66 In his completion, the Courtier will be fully habituated to 
virtuous action and will both seem to be and be effortless in practice; in other words, in 
his excellence there will be no disunion between what he seems to be and what he is. 
However, in the absence of completion, it is still worthwhile for a courtier who is 
habituating himself to virtue to evince sprezzatura: this laudable quality both signals his 
deliberate choice of a worthy aim and serves as a personal calling to account whose 
countersign is found in the active process of more successfully striking his mark. Indeed, 
the better habituated a courtier is to virtuous actions, the greater effortlessness he will 
exhibit in his undertakings. 
Accusations of profligacy are not only aimed at Castiglione for his advocacy of 
sprezzatura, however. At first glance, we might think that the courtier's attention to 
courtly manners seems better befitted to an affected dilettante than an ethically aware, 
pragmatic political agent: in other words, his attention to manners and courtly conduct 
seems to be non-ethical. Lawrence Ryan identifies Aristotle's ethical imprint on the text 
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but suggests that Castiglione's focus on seemingly frivolous manners and decorum is 
largely a function of 
the author's artistic instincts [which] may have told him that in order to make [his doctrine] 
acceptable to an aristocratic literary audience, he would have to begin with the familiar, with the 
courtly code as they already understood and practiced it, as well as to delight them through the 
depiction of characters from real life with whose thoughts and manners they could identify. Only 
by starting where his readers were, however long he may seem to have taken in getting them under 
way, could he guide them, gently and subtly, to his own more perfect vision of courtiership.67 
While the manners Castiglione's interlocutors describe serve a purpose here, it is 
suggested that this purpose is merely to lure the audience — and presumably the 
interlocutors themselves — to a consideration of grander ethical and political problems. 
Jennifer Richards, however, identifies the interlocutor's "preoccupation with aesthetic 
decorum" as more than an exemplary, foppish lesson in learning how to give pleasure and 
suggests that the interlocutors' interests — and their very manner of discussing these 
interests — reflects a recognition of the virtue of temperance.68 Virtuously temperate 
decorum, then, serves as "a means to accommodate listeners to a variety of perspectives, 
to remind them of the importance of their audience, and to contain willful self-assertion" 
with a final political view to affecting the relation of power between courtiers and their 
prince.69 Aristotle, however, identifies the virtue of temperance as that virtue which is 
concerned with the bodily appetite for touch, in the form of food and sex.70 He tells us 
that 
Temperance, then, will be about bodily pleasures, but not even about all of these. For those who 
find enjoyment in objects and sights, such as colors, shapes, a painting, are called neither 
temperate nor intemperate, even though it would also seem possible to enjoy these either rightly or 
excessively and deficiently. The same is true for hearing; no one is ever called intemperate for 
excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting, or temperate for the right enjoyment of them.71 
Aristotle's affirmation that the activities he describes can find a virtuous mean between 
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excess and deficiency suggests that our display and sensory enjoyment of manifest 
qualities are indeed subject to ethical consideration: however, it is problematic to identify 
the virtue of temperance too closely with the interlocutors' dialogues about fitting courtly 
manners. 
Though Castiglione's courtier is instructed to make a pleasing show of himself at 
court, his manners are essentially consociational in character: in other words, they reflect 
a consideration for right modes of action (and interaction) within a courtly setting. 
Certainly the courtier's displays are predicated upon his awareness of their perceptibility 
to others and their ability to satisfy others' pleasures, however they can also reveal him to 
be a social man of goodwill. Burke observes that while Castiglione invokes a number of 
standard classical, medieval, and early Renaissance terms throughout the text, he also lays 
a distinct and uncommon emphasis on terms such as "affable (affabile)," "amiable 
(amabile)," and "pleasing (piacevole)" in his treatment of good behaviour.72 In this vein, I 
propose that The Book of the Courtier implicitly recognizes the political merit of 
cultivating an ethos of civility at court. Rather than associating the courtier's pleasing 
manners with the virtue of temperance, however, I suggest that the virtue of civility is 
closely tied to the small virtue of "friendliness" and to its corresponding virtues of 
"truthfulness" and wit. These deeply interrelated virtues offer us the opportunity to better 
understand how and why courtiers might commonly engage in right and graceful actions 
in their interactions at court. Ultimately, the cultivation of civility carries import not only 
for courtiers' relations to their prince but for their relations to one another as well: civility 
helps to inform shifts and movements in court status which, in turn, affect relations of 
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power in ways that can serve to preserve or upset courtly regimes. To understand how 
this virtue can come to affect court dynamics, however, we must first turn to an 
examination of the quality of civility. 
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CHAPTER 2 
"WAYS AND MANNERS": CIVILITY AS ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE 
Though Castiglione is attentive to the pleasing modes of speech and behaviour 
which must characterize the courtier's actions, he is also at pains to distinguish these 
from the flatterer's affectations: at first glance both the most refined courtier and the 
wiliest flatterer might resemble one another in their appeal to others' pleasures, but the 
courtier is compelled to give particular attention to the limits as well as to the distinct 
ends of his pleasing behaviour. The man at court must take careful stock of himself as 
well as his companions in order to know how to adapt his manners to court life in a fitting 
way: he must not only be able to please but to please "well," and this holds true in his 
relations with other courtiers as well as in his relations to his prince. While it is unlikely 
that any courtier will be complete in his adherence to civility, it will be his task to 
acclimate himself to this quality of character in his courtly interactions. If the courtier is 
to have right relations with his acquaintances and his prince, then, he ought to reflect 
upon and have some understanding of why and how he cultivates appealing and graceful 
manners or, more precisely, why and how he must appeal to the pleasures of others. 
Civility as an Ethical and Political Virtue 
Though we can readily recognize that civility serves a practicable goal — that is, 
it helps facilitate social interaction by promoting goodwill in our everyday social 
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situations — we may still harbour the suspicion that there is something false in 
identifying civility as an ethical virtue and in describing good manners as being ethically 
imperative. The popular distinction made between an intrinsic moral good and the 
superficial display of manners lingers. G.A. Johnston aptly recounts the popular opinion 
which sharply partitions the realm of morals from the realm of manners: 
The plain man cherishes the distinction between manners and morals. Morals, he believes, are of 
the heart, manners are only skin-deep. Morality is the expression of a man's inmost character, 
courtesy a superficial veneer. Morals are natural, manners artificial. Morals are spontaneous, 
manners petrified. Morals are honest and straightforward, manners deceitful and sinuous. The 
popular mind delights in such contrasts as that in "The Cloister and the Hearth" between the rough, 
unmannerly German who sells good shoes and the smooth, polite Frenchman who sells bad shoes.1 
An understanding that good manners can be misappropriated for bad ends as well as an 
understanding that the civil man must circumscribe and shape his actions according to an 
understanding of others' characters, seem only to confirm our suspicions about the 
fundamental incredibility of civil behaviour. From an Aristotelian perspective and 
against common sentiment, however, it is impossible to rend mannered actions from 
ethical actions: the ethical content of our character is in part determined and revealed by 
how we choose to act and react in everyday social situations. To begin to allay the 
wholesale suspicion that many have cast upon good manners, we must turn to a 
consideration of the quality of civility as an ethical virtue. 
David Colclough writes that an ethos of suspicion founded upon the distinction 
between the truthful man who speaks without adornment or harshly and the false man 
who speaks in a pleasing manner is central to the classical Greek understanding of free 
political speech2: good and trustworthy counsel is least suspect when it comes from the 
candid man who does not deign to indulge the pleasures of his audience by making his 
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arguments and especially his admonishments palatable to their sensibilities. Colclough 
exposits that from Plato to Demosthenes, citizens' willingness to tolerate the harsh 
delivery of salient truths in public debates has been, in part, an index of the health of that 
society's political freedom.4 Free and noble men welcome the opportunity to both offer 
and receive unpleasantly-presented truths, particularly when they are contradistinguished 
from the pleasant stylings of "dangerous demagogues who win over the populace with 
devious rhetoric and bare-faced flattery."5 The subsequent wedding of frank and pleasing 
speech is identified as the necessary and palliative expedient that any political speaker 
must employ if he is to win his audience: Roman rhetoricians soon made "the association 
between frankness and 'praise' (laus) or flattery; they are not, as in the Greek texts, 
directly opposed to one another, but rather held together as having usefully 
complementary effects. Before certain audiences, either frankness or 'praise' alone could 
be unhelpful, one causing 'wrath and annoyance' and the other 'error'; but when 
combined they prevent either."6 However, it might be hasty to characterize the Greeks as 
adhering to a simple oppositional distinction between pleasing and truthful speech: 
Woodhouse, for example, points to Plato's advocacy of measured seemliness in word and 
deed in the Politicus and identifies it as a guiding principle in subsequent classical and 
Renaissance texts treating various subjects from oratory to deportment — including 
Castiglione's own.7 In any event, Colclough argues that this adulterated conception of 
free speech came to underpin early modern European discourse on the nature and 
possibilities of political counsel, especially in view of the counselor's task to counsel his 
prince: 
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The counsellor was variously imagined as being the prince's inferior governor, to be entrusted with 
the administration of provinces of die realm or with the management of policy, or as a philosopher 
or sage who would proffer more general advice on the moral conduct of government. [. . .] The 
friendly admonition that he was obliged to supply should, it was argued, appeal to the reason rather 
than (like flattery) to the passions; indeed, the contrast between these appeals to the two different 
parts of die prince's soul was regarded as one of the tell-tale signs in distinguishing flattery from 
counsel.8 
The counselor found himself torn between his allegiance to philosophical truth and 
political necessity and so was caught in an "apparent double bind of remaining wedded to 
the truth but separated from the arena in which it could be uttered, or taking a place at the 
council table and finding [his] advice ignored or punished."9 The device of mingling 
pleasing and true speech, though politically useful, is nevertheless painted as the 
concession which must be made to a soft audience who cannot bear to hear the harsh 
tones which are presumed to accompany hard and flinty truths: the truth, it is supposed, 
must be depreciated and adorned when it is inserted into public debate since few are 
willing to receive the man who reveals its harsh and unyielding face. 
It is useful to note that Colclough's own analysis briefly raises the ethical question 
that faces audiences who are on the receiving end of what are characterized as harsh 
political truths. In his discussion of Isocrates' explicit valorization of his own strident but 
truthful oratory in "On the Peace" Colclough writes: 
this explicit announcement of the intention to speak freely [ensures] that the audience or reader is 
aware of the speaker's valorisation of his or her words, and is forced to take a position in relation 
to this valorisation: is this true free speech or simply abuse? Is it appropriate or not? Such 
questions force me auditor or reader into an area of ethical consideration which immediately 
validates the notion of free speech even if what is being responded to is not accepted as such.1 
The limits of pleasing speech are not the only question under consideration, the limits of 
harsh speech must also be taken into account. The flatterer might appeal to the popular 
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imagination by disguising his false ideas under the guise of pleasing words, but the 
abusive boor might just as easily disguise his own false ideas by assuming the guise of the 
maverick benefactor who delivers salvation in the form of bracing truth. In other words, 
the demagogue might just as easily appeal to the popular imagination by playing to his 
audience's desire to see themselves, and to be seen by others, as stalwart lovers of truth 
who are sturdy enough to withstand — if not actively welcome — the most strident 
delivery of truth. In either case, the uses and incidence of pleasure in political discourse 
are rendered suspect: if an audience accepts a pleasingly-packaged proposition, then they 
leave themselves open to the accusation of being self-indulgent and bovinely duped by 
the popular but detrimental machinations of the flatterer; if they reject a harshly presented 
proposition, then they leave themselves open to the consonant accusation of insipidly 
withering under the salutary truths of a man who disdains the trifling and misleading — if 
not outright false — conventions of decorum. Colclough describes Isocrates as 
establishing in his oration the very conditions which close off the political possibilities 
attendant to his audience's decision-making process: "Isocrates invokes a number of 
contextual factors to excuse his boldness: the nature of the audience; their potential 
reaction to a speech of this nature, and the intention of the speaker. Any who attempt to 
challenge him are, by this argument, making a terrible error of judgement and playing into 
the hands of the state's enemies."11 Indeed, politics that are contextualized by an ethos of 
strong suspicion toward pleasing words seem to be as much predicated upon a dare as 
upon due consideration of an argument's merits: accept a pleasantly-framed proposition 
or reject an unpleasantly-framed one at your peril, the audience is told, for your concern 
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with pleasing decorum reveals you to be soft and base creatures who are unfit to contend 
with hard and unpleasant political truths — the unflinching acceptance of which must 
accompany truly free rule. 
Alternately, we might conceive of pleasing modes of speech and action as that 
which ought to accompany good social and political discourse: it might be right, in other 
words, that we consider and appeal to others' pleasure as well as their reason when we 
engage with them socially and politically. Man, as Aristotle so famously reminds us, is an 
intrinsically political animal.12 The assertion that we are each naturally consociational is 
significantly different from the assertion that we are each naturally distinct as individuals. 
The former asserts that as a complete human being we are both our distinct selves and our 
relational selves. Man cannot be counted a complete human being without either self 
and, were we able to separate these out, we could say that neither "self is more 
particularly authentic than the other. We do not exist either in relation to ourselves or in 
relation to others but rather, as human beings, we exist in relation to ourselves and others. 
The notion of man as an individual takes a significantly different view of our nature and 
of our social and political associations: 
In a civilization with a certain degree of maturity people know that what needs to be brought out 
into the open where it can be considered jointly or collectively, and what should be left to the 
idiosyncratic individual responses of each of us. This is the cultural recognition of the complexity 
of life, and of the great variety of essentially ununifiable worlds in which we live. [...] We do not 
have to deal with the full truth about our feelings and opinions in order to interact usefully and 
effectively: In many respects each of us can carry on with our personal fantasies and attitudes, and 
with our private reactions to what we know about the private reactions of others, while at the same 
time dealing with one another on a fairly well-defined, limited field of encounter with regard to 
those matters that demand a more collective reaction.13 
Here, first and finally, we are our distinct selves: we are wholly private animals. Though 
we find it necessary, useful and sometimes pleasant to interact with others, this 
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associationalism is not an intrinsic part of ourselves. Indeed, as Nagel suggests, when the 
individual deals with others he partially constrains his true (that is, distinct) self and acts 
within an external and artificial matrix of agreed-upon manners; he does this in order to 
avoid transgressing upon others' private selves (by suspending his oppositional reactions 
to others) and to protect his own private self (by averting others' oppositional reactions to 
himself).14 When we are civil we are being untrue to ourselves and are engaging in a 
more-or-less conscious deception. Together, civility and good manners constitute nice 
and expedient artifices which close off our own individual states and valuations from 
others' individual states and valuations: civility and good manners, then, are not in play 
once we get down to serious business where we must abandon civility in favour of frank 
and open discussion. No wonder, then, that Nagel can write of the limits of civility in 
politics thus: 
What we can tolerate having out in the open between us depends on what we think we can handle 
jointly without crippling our relations for other purposes. [. . .] In general it's not a bad idea to 
stick with the conventions of reticence that have developed to govern social, commercial, and 
professional interactions in normal circumstances. It is best not to overload the field of interaction 
with excess emotional and normative baggage. On the other hand, politeness sometimes excludes 
material which, though disruptive, is relevant to the matter at hand and whose exclusion affects the 
results. [. . .] Politeness is also a disadvantage where one party to a situation takes advantage of 
the conventions of mutual restraint to make excessive claims whose excessiveness he knows cannot 
be publicly pointed out without impoliteness. Politeness leaves us with few weapons against 
grasping selfishness except exclusion from the society, and that is not always an available option.15 
Civility is conceived of as that which allows us to be distinctly private people even in 
public, to adhere to our own ideas and judgements, and to extinguish contest. When 
some conflicting private valuations take on such urgency that they must be contested we 
are required to abandon civility in favour of ostensibly open, frank and less-than-civil 
encounters to determine whose idea will prevail. Civility, here, is rendered a disposable 
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artifice for extrinsically associational individuals rather than a necessary virtue which is 
practiced by intrinsically consociational human beings. 
Man as a social and political animal, however, is not an island of distinctive and 
idiosyncratic affective and thought states complete onto himself. Rather than conceiving 
of each man as being an essentially atomized vessel containing a personal identity which 
is defined by a number of peculiar states, Aristotle considers each of us to be born with 
capacity: like all forms of life we are materially bounded and have the physical capacity 
to move through our environment (if only through growth);16 as with all animal forms of 
life we have the capacity for sensory perception of our environment;17 but unlike other 
forms of life human beings have the capacity for reason. Each of these capacities 
(barring, perhaps, the capacity for growth) have a good or bad end which, to a greater or 
lesser degree, we can effect through right or wrong action.19 The unique function of man 
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is to exercise his capacity by engaging in actions in accordance with reason. However, 
the single man does not simply exercise his capacities well (or poorly) by praxis in 
reference to an inborn but abstracted idea of the good: rather, he has the inborn, ever-
present capacity to act well or poorly and learns how to effect good or bad actions. 
Prudence is the virtue of thought which deals with knowledge of the truth about 
particulars22 — or, in other words, prudence is that which is "concerned with action about 
things that are good or bad for a human being."23 Though we each have the capacity for 
prudent thought, our understanding of particulars and how we should act to live well is 
heavily influenced by our experiences.24 Human character, then, is comprised of and 
revealed by the actions a man chooses to undertake vis-a-vis the best aim of living well. 
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If each man has properly constituted capacities for choice and action why, then, 
does Aristotle assert that 
The city is [...] prior by nature to the household and to each of us. For the whole must of necessity 
be prior to the part; for if the whole [body] is destroyed there will not be a foot or a hand, unless in 
the sense that the term is similar (as when one speaks of a hand of stone), but the thing will be 
defective. [. . .] That the city is both by nature and prior to each individual, then, is clear. For if 
the individual when separated [from it] is not self-sufficient, he will be in a condition similar to 
that of the other parts in relation to the whole. One who is incapable of participating or who is in 
need of nothing through being self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god?25 
If the single human being contains within himself the capacity for virtue of character and 
thought why must he also be intrinsically consociational? We can begin to answer this 
question by understanding that as a materially bounded creature, each man is necessarily 
circumscribed in his ability to know: that is, each man's experience is necessarily finite 
and he can only attain so much knowledge about the particular truths of human existence. 
The development of character requires capacity, thought and action: while for the most 
part each man is equal in capacity, he is limited in what he knows and so is limited in his 
ability to act well. Even if we assume that he deliberates well and correctly understands 
that which he experiences — an improbable assumption in itself since we are all severally 
talented in our deliberative faculties26 — the intrinsic limits upon his ability to observe all 
particulars suggests that, to some degree, he still errs by omission. If it is a part of each 
man's estate to be wanting in those things which allow us to live a fully human life, then 
we will seek out others to help alleviate this mutual want. Only those who are divinely 
inspired with complete knowledge of particulars or those who are bestially unconcerned 
with relieving their estate can consider themselves, rightly or wrongly, devoid of a 
consociational self. 
This idea concerning the nature and the proper ends of man informs our ethical 
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understanding of the virtue of civility. Enhancing and evaluating our incomplete 
knowledge of particulars is central to cultivating prudent thought and virtuous action in 
our social and political interactions. Through communication, in other words, we each 
proclaim and consider the merits of several particular courses of action and proposed 
ends. However, given our bounded experiences, we are each limited in our ability to 
express a right and true course of action: hence, even as we enter into community we enter 
into contest to discern which of us have the best claims to describing right actions. 
Civility, though, is not an external protective wall that we place between our several, 
wholly distinct authentic selves once we enter society: instead, it is an ethical virtue 
which compels us to act in a way which acknowledges our complex nature as both limited 
and consociational beings. We each come together for the purpose of exchanging and 
enhancing knowledge and understanding, not to seek dominance for our peculiar 
understanding irrespective of others.' Indeed, in his discussion of civility as an 
Aristotelian virtue of character Philip Smith points to "the logic of intolerance" that we 
must adopt before we can justify treating all others as opponents to abuse and annihilate 
rather than fellows to commune with: 
The assumption that truth exists is not the problem. We need further assumptions to make the 
logic of intolerance work. First, we need to think, not only that truth is valuable, but also that we 
have access to the right formulation of the truth. Second, we must assume that we have access to 
the right formulation of the truth independent of the thought of those who disagree with us. Third, 
we must believe that the truth itself is compatible with intolerance. A "fallibilist". rejects the first 
two of these assumptions; that is, a fallibilist will always keep alive in her mind the possibility that 
she is wrong, and she will believe that opposing views may be useful — perhaps necessary — in 
the pursuit of truth.27 
While the virtue of civility certainly does not require us to be self-denying, it does require 
us to avoid the rocky shoals of excessive egoism in asserting our claims to truth and to 
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avoid overturning the very ends we pursue by entering into community with others. 
Though Cheshire Calhoun and Sarah Buss both consider civil actions to be characterized 
by constraint of our ostensibly authentic selves, they usefully identify the moral principle 
upon which civility rests. Civility, Calhoun tells us, is not just a negative mode of 
inaction: civility must also take the form of positive expression — it is an "essentially 
communicative form of moral conduct" which is clothed by a meaningful display of 
manners.28 Buss tells us that to behave civilly toward another "is to act in a way that 
acknowledges their dignity, and to act this way because they have dignity. [...] When we 
treat one another politely, we are directly expressing respect for one another in the only 
way possible. We are, in effect, saying: 'I respect you,' 'I acknowledge your dignity.'"29 
In other words, by behaving civilly we are communicating our implicit affirmation of a 
moral principle which acknowledges the intrinsic moral dignity of other human beings 
and their worth to us as fellows. We are not just valuing others, as is proper to a fully 
constituted human being, we are also making sure that those others know that we value 
them and how. We must recall, however, that as human animals we are each endowed 
with the capacity for pleasure and pain (via our capacity for sensory perception) as well as 
the capacity for reason: though we must employ our reason to determine how we are to 
best give and receive pleasure, it does not follow that we must seek to annul that part of 
ourselves which has the capacity for pleasure — even, and perhaps especially, when we 
find ourselves engaged in a reasoned consideration of what is right or true. Any complete 
consideration of human dignity must encompass a consideration of our human capacity 
for pleasure as well as our capacity for reason: in his social and political interactions, the 
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civil man will measure his words and deeds in a way that demonstrates that he values 
both. 
It is not quite right, then, to consider civility to be little more than a trigger lock 
that we willingly impose on our fundamentally warring selves because we agree that it is 
more comfortable to avoid certain skirmishes lest we descend into a state of perpetual 
war. Civility as a virtue tacitly acknowledges our shared limitations and the peculiarity of 
our several understandings: certainly, it acknowledges the tensions that are bred from 
testing these different conceptions of particulars and the good when we enter into the 
company of others. However, it also acknowledges that in seeking the company of others 
we can engage in contests about these things in a right way. Civility is not that which we 
adhere to until it is time to enter into contest; it is that which allows us to contest in the 
right way. In practice, the goodwill evoked by pleasing manners can help mediate — 
without dissolving — the tensions bred of conflict so that they are not disproportionate to 
the endeavour. Certainly praise and admonishment alike are a part of the political 
endeavour, but we must not suspect that pleasing manners are in themselves a simple sign 
of obsequity or a form of duplicity fitted only to the slavish or the base, nor must we 
accept that an utter disregard for pleasing manners ought to accompany truth claims or 
our efforts to mediate these claims. Instead, when adapting our manners to our social and 
political contexts, we must consciously consider who we must please or pain as well as 
how, when and why we must please or pain them. Aristotle's discussion of the small 
virtues of "friendliness," "truthfulness" and wit seems to offer some guidance in helping 
us deliberate about the ethical import of our manners. 
40 
The Virtues of Civility 
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies three virtues of character which 
ought to govern our interactions "in meeting people, living together, and common 
dealings in conversations and actions."30 The first of these virtues, "friendliness," 
characterizes the friendly person as one who will act in a manner which allows him to 
share pleasure with and avoid visiting pain upon others.31 The second virtue, 
"truthfulness," describes the truthful person as one who observes honest and decent 
limits in conveying his own qualities to others.32 The third, "wit," concerns the witty 
person who is conscious of sharing pleasure and avoiding pain so that he both hears and 
tells jokes in a fitting manner.33 Together, these virtues address the question of how and 
why manners ought to be observed in our common, routine but less-than-intimate 
engagement with others. 
Of these three, Peter Johnson identifies the virtue commonly rendered as 
"friendliness" as that which is most closely associated with civility. Remarking upon the 
formal namelessness of this virtue, Johnson asserts that 
The idea that the mean between too much and too little deference to others is logically complex 
gives us a clue to its namelessness. Indeed, Aristotle seems to accept that such intricacy is not 
open to purely quantitative understanding, and this makes it difficult for us to think of it as a state 
specifying a single, named virtue. Its composition is better explained in terms of a variety of 
feelings and dispositions, virtues and manners. [.. .] Aristotle is right to leave it nameless, but for 
the straightforward reason that there is no single state to name. The notion of a single state is a 
fiction.34 
Johnson's suggestion that the particular instances of friendliness are too wide-ranging and 
complex to narrowly and exhaustively detail is cogent. However, his observation that 
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"friendliness" does not encompass a single, distinct virtue leads him down the 
problematic path of teasing out a multitude of hidden virtues which are ostensibly 
subsumed under "friendliness." These constituent virtues include politeness ("It is to put 
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aside one's own dispositions and preoccupations to allow others to express their own.") ; 
agreeableness ("the presence of a willingness to agree to accommodate or please 
others") ; accommodation ("a willingness to adjust to meet the specific requirements of 
others") ; propriety ("a compass for the virtues" which allows us to judge and react to 
the moral appropriateness of our own and others' behaviour)38; and civility ("a virtue 
displayed in the disposition to treat others civilly, to approach them with consideration 
and respect"). Certainly, the dispositions identified here as virtues seem cognate with 
Aristotle's conception of friendliness in the sense that they are concerned with "the 
proper ways to spare or to hurt the feelings"40 of our acquaintances, and in detailing these 
dispositions Johnson helps to illuminate our understanding of the spirit of friendliness. 
However, from an Aristotelian standpoint it is questionable whether these dispositions 
can be identified as virtues proper. 
First, these dispositions tend to adhere to an antipodal binary schema of virtue and 
vice which is devoid of a particular virtuous mean: one might be polite or impolite or 
somewhere in-between, for instance, but in this case any medial point fails to identify a 
virtuous state situated between a vice of excess and a vice of deficiency. Second, the 
overflne distinctions wrought between these dispositions tend to dissect friendliness into 
a number of constituent parts, giving each the pronounced appearance of being essentially 
alienated from the others. The effect of this is to obscure the close and complex 
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relationship between these dispositions. For example, that which Johnson identifies as 
"propriety" corresponds closely to Aristotle's notion that, vis-a-vis friendliness, we must 
"always refer to the fine and beneficial' as an overarching consideration in judging and 
identifying the right limits of friendly behaviour. Though Johnson acknowledges that 
propriety is less a distinct virtue than it is a guiding principle,42 the particularly close 
relationship he draws between "propriety" and "accommodation"43 seems 
overdiscriminate. We can just as easily imagine being guided by propriety in our polite, 
agreeable or otherwise right-mannered behaviour. Consider, too, the difficulty of 
consistently distinguishing between these dispositions. It is difficult, for example, to 
imagine being polite (or agreeable, or accommodating) without also being civil. 
Ultimately, from an Aristotelian standpoint, it seems better to consider these qualities as 
dispositions which help to characterize the spirit or principle of "friendliness" rather than 
as distinct, categorical virtues onto themselves. 
Johnson's analysis of the nameless virtue rendered "friendliness" remains apposite 
in two respects, however. First, through Johnson's examination of the spirit of this virtue 
we arrive at an understanding that the principle it describes rehearses a good part of 
civility's constituent qualities. Though friendliness plays a significant part in informing 
our understanding of civility, we should not utterly conflate these two lest we risk 
ignoring the other constituent qualities of civility or eliding the relationship of 
"friendliness" to the virtue of friendship. Aristotle compares and contrasts these last two 
virtues by saying 
This state [i.e., friendliness] has no name, but it would seem to be most like friendship; for the 
character of the person in the intermediate state is just what we mean in speaking of a decent 
friend, except that the friend is also fond of us. It differs from friendship in not requiring any 
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special feeling or any fondness for the people we meet. For this person takes each thing in the 
right way to new and old acquaintances, to familiar companions and strangers without distinction, 
except that he will also do what is suitable for each; for the proper ways to spare or to hurt the 
feelings of familiar companions are not the proper ways to treat strangers.44 
We can observe that this relationship is not insubstantial: for example, the goodwill 
which characteristically arises from friendliness is identified as a necessary precursor to 
the more enduring love which is characteristic of friendship.45 While remaining mindful 
of the correspondence between this virtue and the virtue of friendship, we can still benefit 
from identifying this "friendliness" as a part of "civility" since the term puts us in mind 
of what we might owe others in cultivating those outward, pleasing displays of speech 
and action we call "manners." Second, the formal namelessness of this virtue may indeed 
point us toward an understanding of its close relationship to other virtues. Contra 
Johnson, however, these other virtues are not constitutive of friendliness but are distinct 
from and immediately adjacent to friendliness. Here, we refer to the cognate virtues of 
"truthfulness" and "wit." What can we learn of these three virtues, two of which — 
"friendliness" and "truthfulness" — are formally nameless and one of which is alternately 
described as "wittiness," "agile-wittedness"46 and "dexterousness?"47 All three virtues, 
Aristotle tells us, are "concerned with common dealings in certain conversations and 
actions. They differ insofar as one is concerned with truth, the others with what is 
pleasant. One of those concerned with pleasure is found in amusements, and the other in 
our behaviour in the other aspects of life when we meet people."48 It should be noted that 
these virtues are not unique in their namelessness: the virtue concerning small honours, 
for example, is similarly nameless. It should also be observed that these three identified 
virtues as identifiable virtues are meaningfully and necessarily distinct from one another. 
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However, the formal problems attendant to naming — and, so, firmly delineating — these 
virtues might tacitly compel the reader to consider their close, symbiotic relationship: 
though they are not perfectly triune, they form a close triad of virtues. These three 
virtues, in other words, seem inextricably and thematically linked through their shared 
concern with civility and the proper manners which ought to characterize the virtuous 
person's everyday interactions. 
The virtue of friendliness, the first of these to be introduced, seems to compass the 
widest scope when dealing with manners: it is the virtue concerned with our modes of 
behaviour in almost all common social situations. This virtue addresses the proper mien 
we must adopt with others in order to please or avoid paining them by our words or 
actions: as with any virtue, we must always act "at the right times, about the right things, 
toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way."49 When we fall short of 
the mean and are unconcerned with even the good pleasures and pains of others, we 
position ourselves in opposition to our company and are revealed as "cantankerous and 
quarrelsome."50 Because the quarrelsome man cannot be moved to right action in 
everyday situations acquaintances correctly and quite readily characterize him as 
indifferent to his company's pleasures and pains and, so, viciously asocial. When we 
exceed the proper bounds of this virtue, we behave obsequiously and reveal ourselves to 
be either ingratiating (if we are oversolicitous in our efforts to please) or flatterers (if we 
seek some material return for our behaviour).51 Of these two, the flatterer seems furthest 
from the mean: while the ingratiating person seeks the correct end in his actions, the 
flatterer chooses an end which is not proper to the virtue of friendliness. We can imagine 
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that the ingratiating person will too easily err, for example, by attempting to please the 
wrong person or the right person but in the wrong way in an effort to promote goodwill: 
in other words, there is a blameable but redeeming unwittingness about his actions. 
Because he still seeks the proper aim of friendliness — that is, sharing in the pleasure of 
others in social situations — we can suppose that the ingratiating man is not too far from 
being corrected and striking the mean. In any event, he is not so far from this as the 
flatterer. Because the flatterer primarily and quite consciously appeals to the pleasure as a 
means of achieving gain, it is a matter of relative indifference to him whether he pleases 
the wrong person in the wrong way so long as he profits thereby. Unlike the ingratiating 
man, the flatterer entirely disavows the proper end of friendliness. In this sense, he is as 
asocial as the quarrelsome man because he reveals himself to be fundamentally 
unconcerned with ethical consociationalism in everyday situations: however, he will be 
more adept at evading discovery than the quarrelsome man because his actions more 
closely mimic those of the friendly and the ingratiating person. This evasion is important 
for the flatterer because it obscures his indifference to his companions, except insofar as 
they are instruments for his gain, and allows him to maintain his place in social situations 
from which he seeks to exact this gain. 
The pronounced interpersonal nature of friendliness suggests that our own 
deportment can only be developed in accord with virtue if we are adept at refining our 
social acumen: in other words, the civil man must be skilful at observing others and be 
acutely aware of the character of the company he keeps in order to best judge how he 
ought to behave. In turn, this implies that he must not only judge whether the company 
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he keeps pursues good or bad pleasures, but he must even come to know how good 
companions partake of their pleasures. In order to behave civilly, then, we must learn 
how to skilfully negotiate the conventional manners which mediate our good 
companions' pleasures. If we neglect to observe decorum while in good company, we 
risk behaving in an unseemly way and inadvertently causing pain. When we happen to 
find ourselves in sufficiently bad company, however, we are enjoined by virtue to cause 
some measure of discomfort or pain. The friendly man, Aristotle tells us, must always 
refer to the good in choosing his actions and if he finds 
that it is not fine, or it is harmful, for him to share [the bad pleasures of his company], he will 
object and will decide to cause pain instead. Further, if the other person will suffer no slight 
disgrace or harm from doing an action, and only slight pain if he is crossed, the virtuous person 
will object to the action and not accept it. [. ..] What he will choose in itself is to share pleasure 
and avoid causing pain. But he will be guided by consequences, if they are greater — mat is to 
say, by the fine and the expedient; and to secure great pleasure in the future he will cause slight 
pain.52 
We can, for example, imagine meeting with a moderately quarrelsome acquaintance who 
has alienated himself from many of his companions through his churlish behaviour. In 
this case we do not go amiss if we object to his bad manners. However — insofar as it 
remains commensurable to the offence and the situation — our objection might take a 
number of recognizable forms besides harsh rebuke. We might communicate our 
objection by emphasizing the contrast between our acquaintance's behaviour and our 
own: we might choose to maintain a coolly decorous manner or remain pointedly silent in 
the face of his hostility. Decorum can guide us even in admonishment: this is not to 
suggest that our response should be disproportionate to the offence but, rather, that 
conventions can offer many salient ways to deliver admonishment. However we object, 
if our acquaintance reveals himself to be vicious of character — that is, if he cannot be 
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corrected or convinced to pursue better action for the sake of those pleasures which 
accrue from civil interaction — we will have to abandon his company if only to secure 
our own greater pleasure. 
The virtue rendered as "truthfulness" seems inextricably linked to the virtue of 
friendliness since it is concerned both with how we display ourselves to others and how 
others react to this display. While the virtue of friendliness is notably outward-looking in 
its focus, truthfulness is a virtue primarily concerned with an inward-looking form of self-
representation. "Having discussed those who aim at giving pleasure or pain when they 
meet people" Aristotle turns his attention to a discussion of "those who are truthful and 
false, both in words and in actions [. . .] in their claims [about themselves]."53 The 
truthful person, in this case, is one who is able to intelligently evaluate his own good 
qualities of character and to display these qualities to others in a fitting manner.54 He 
should have a correct sense of self-esteem and should desire and accept praise in 
proportion to his worth. While truthfulness in matters of self-representation does not take 
on the urgency attendant to truthfulness in matters of justice, it is suggested that the 
truthful man will be more inclined to behave ethically and to seek truth when more 
consequential matters of justice are in question.55 Decency in everyday matters, however, 
first requires that the truthful man avoid behaving in either a viciously self-deprecating or 
viciously boastful manner.56 
Of these vices, however, boastfulness is particularly troublesome and complex: 
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indeed, the vice of self-deprecation itself is rendered "boastfulness" in its extreme form. 
Those who are given to boasting unabashedly for the sake of being able to claim qualities 
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they do not possess are simply fatuous — that is, they are eminently blameworthy because 
they revel in and take their pleasure from acting falsely.58 However, a more familiar 
distinction is made between other boasters: some boast in order to win a fine reputation 
for themselves and are "not to be blamed too much as [boasters]" while others are "more 
disgraceful" because their actions are directed toward achieving the stature which will 
lead to material gain.59 The critical distinction is this: "Boasters who aim at reputation 
[. . .] claim the qualities that win praise or win congratulation for happiness. Boasters 
who aim at profit claim the qualities that gratify other people and that allow someone to 
avoid detection when he claims to be what he is not."60 Because the former is rightly 
oriented vis-a-vis virtue itself, he is less blameworthy than the latter. In other words, the 
boaster who seeks a good reputation is the man who has evaluated the state of his 
character and is duly chagrined by his shortcomings: he understands that what is truly 
praiseworthy is in accord with virtue and that virtue, in turn, is in accord with and helps 
lead us toward the principle good of happiness.61 He falls short of truthfulness because 
he seeks praise for good qualities that he does not yet possess, but we can also imagine 
that he is the sort of man who would both desire and feel compelled to develop the 
praiseworthy qualities he has claimed for himself. Because he is consciously and acutely 
aware of his deficiency and of how this deficiency ultimately leads to his own 
blameworthy state, he will seek to improve himself and to develop the qualities that will 
justify the praise he prematurely wins from others. Further, he cannot fail to be aware of 
how his lack of truthfulness itself contributes to his shortcomings: he might remedy this 
lapse by confessing his lack of truthfulness to others or he might remedy it by ambitiously 
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developing the praiseworthy characteristics he claims becoming, in effect, truthful. Since 
this boaster has already revealed himself to be sensitive to the judgement of others and 
somewhat oversolicitous of their praise, it is less likely that he will bring due shame to 
himself by confessing his lapse than it is that he will duly act to live up to his claims. The 
boaster who seeks good reputation assuredly errs at first, but he is not irremediably 
vicious and might readily be lead to improve his character and to achieve the virtue of 
truthfulness.62 
The boaster who aims primarily at material gain is a more pernicious man, and 
akin to the flatterer in that he is motivated to act primarily by the promise of wealth — 
though in the particular case of the servile flatterer who praises men far beyond their 
worth while seeming to depreciate himself, it might be that the vices of self-deprecation 
and boasting for profit are particularly closely linked. This understanding, of course, does 
not rest upon a facile condemnation of the pursuit of wealth: indeed, we know that wealth 
rightly used can contribute to our happiness.63 However, the man who deceives for profit 
does not have the right attitude toward wealth or virtue. Though his appearance mimics 
that of the truthful man who is solicitous of and wins a reputation for worth, the boaster 
for profit is viciously asocial in the sense that he is primarily unmoved by considerations 
of winning praise or blame rightly — or, in other words, he is unconcerned with how any 
praise he wins relates to his own character or his actual worth. The primary end he seeks 
is his own profit and if he is able to profit from seeming to be praiseworthy, then he is 
satisfied. If his deception regarding his own worthiness were to be revealed, we can 
imagine that this man would be essentially unmoved and unbothered by the ensuing 
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public disapprobation in itself. His primary concern, in this case, would be that he would 
lose what profit he had gained from his deception or that he would lose the opportunity 
for further profit. It is difficult to imagine that this man's character will compel him 
toward truthfulness: rather, we can imagine that it will compel him further in the direction 
of vice. He will seek to maintain his false reputation lest he risk losing what profit he has 
accrued, but he will see no purpose in trying to be worthy of his reputation. Further, if he 
finds himself dissatisfied with his gains it is likely that he will engage in even more 
outrageous deceptions to win more. The boaster who seeks profit seems almost 
irremediably vicious: he is further away from the mean than the man who boasts in order 
to win good reputation and is closer to the utterly vicious fatuous boaster. 
The virtue of truthfulness suggests that our efforts to please others in our common 
dealings must not only be bounded by a consideration of pleasures rightly pursued, but by 
truthfulness rightly adhered to. Civility, in other words, consists not only in observing 
how others take their pleasures and in decorously adjusting our manners according to the 
company we find ourselves in. The virtue of truthfulness serves to remind us that we 
must tailor our own words and deeds according to an honest, self-reflective appraisal of 
ourselves lest we claim or accept too much or too little for ourselves and from our 
companions. While truthfulness is correctly identified as a distinct virtue, it is also 
corollary to civility in this way. 
The virtue of wit deals with one method of engaging in particularly hazardous 
civil actions in a court setting. Our everyday interactions give us ample occasion for 
humour and jokes offer us a particular sort of pleasure which we both tend to be 
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excessively fond of and to misunderstand. "A joke," Aristotle reminds us "is a sort of 
abuse."65 Both jokes and abuse depend upon identifying foibles, or weaknesses of 
character, and bringing them to the attention of others.66 Aristotle further makes the 
distinction between the civilized and the slavish person's amusements: "[this distinction 
can be seen] from old and new comedies; for what people used to find funny was 
shameful abuse, but what they now find funny instead is innuendo, which is considerably 
more seemly."67 The suggestion here is that base humour partakes of and revels in our 
animal nature while abandoning reference to the reasoning part of our souls; it is more 
fitting and seemly for a human being to engage in civilized humour which also pleases or 
stimulates the intellect. This does not mean that good humour must be devoid of 
reference to our animal appetites and desires; instead, it means that we must be mindful 
of their proper place and worth. Jokes which refer to a man's excessive appetite or sexual 
incontinence are not without their place, but they lose their meaning and not a little of 
their comedic value unless they are set against some understanding of the virtue of 
temperance. From this perspective, good humour appeals to the human being as 
something more than an animal. 
An instructive analysis of the dangers of base humour informs the denouement of 
Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose. This may serve to illuminate our understanding of 
humour, the virtues of the wit, the excesses of the buffoon and the deficiencies of the stiff 
boor. The novel's plot hinges upon the murderous Jorge's fictionalized recovery of the 
missing portion of Aristotle's Poetics discussing comedy. In the climactic scene Jorge 
inveighs against Aristotle and the very suggestion that wit and laughter are at all proper to 
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virtue: 
When he laughs, as the wine gurgles in his throat, the villein feels he is master, because he has 
overturned his position with respect to his lord; but this book could teach learned men the clever 
and, from that moment, illustrious artifices that could legitimize the reversal. Then what in the 
villein is still, fortunately, an operation of the belly would be transformed into an operation of the 
brain. That laughter is proper to man is a sign of our limitation, sinners that we are. But from this 
book many corrupt minds could draw the extreme syllogism, whereby laughter is man's end.69 
Jorge's appraisal helps us identify the dangers of base humour: having overturned the 
natural order of things, the bad jester tells jokes which have the effect of subsuming 
reason to appetite. Because the pleasure associated with laughter is so intense, there is a 
particular danger that the jester and his audience will mistakenly come to justify and 
applaud his reversal: that is, there is always the sneaking danger that they will allow their 
intense pleasure to dominate their reason and that they will persuade themselves that it is 
either right or a matter of indifference that they elevate appetite and vice and denigrate 
reason and virtue. Weakness of character might come to be lauded as strength of 
character and be sought after as man's most choiceworthy end. If a clever man were so 
inclined he could easily mount a convincing defence of this sundering of appetite from 
reason and vice from virtue. Such an apology for bad humour might have far-reaching 
consequences, of course, but for our immediate purposes it is sufficient to say that the 
truly witty man will not joke in this base and lawless way. Indeed, Jorge's intuition that 
all humour takes this form and that all wit is fundamentally blameworthy or nihilistic is 
misguided. 
We know that, above all, the witty man will be mindful of hearing and telling 
jokes in the right way.71 This implies that the true wit must begin by understanding how 
and why he jokes: he cannot afford to be innocent of the right relation between reason 
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and appetite and virtue and vice. The crux of good humour seems to lie in its nature as a 
foil: foibles would not be funny if we did not think them somehow absurd and they would 
not be absurd if they did not depart from the natural. That is, if lapses of character were 
in accord with nature they would be in accord with virtue and happiness and would seem 
to be laudable rather than laughable. Laughter, then, seems an appropriate response to 
absurdity: it is right to be pleased by laughter if we recognize laughter as a congruous 
response to an incongruous situation. The wit does not seem to take pleasure in foibles, 
but takes pleasure in acknowledging the queerness of foibles: he laughs at rather than 
with weaknesses of character. 
This, however, is why it is particularly perilous to seek to arouse pleasure in 
relation to that which is also intrinsically painful: laughter at the absurd is appropriate, 
but it also has an air of reproach about it. Though the man of wit must always be mindful 
of how and why he jokes, he must also understand the right ways to provoke laughter: in 
a world abounding with fodder for his humour, he must tread lightly lest he dishonour the 
subject of his joke. What counts as a decent and seemly joke seems to be gauged by the 
worthiness of the person telling the joke and the worthiness of the audience receiving the 
joke.72 Having truthfully appraised his own worth and that of his company "the witty man 
[ought to be] characterized both by a readiness to enjoy a good joke, even the joke is 
directed toward himself [as well as] the ability to make a good joke."73 While the wit is 
necessarily engaged in the act of laughing at foible, he must not exceed the bounds of 
propriety and laugh at more than he would be willing to laugh at in himself. In other 
words, he must not hint at reproach more than he himself is willing to be reproached. Of 
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course, it is also true that he must not tell jokes which are out of proportion to his target's 
worth or he risks imputing more — and, in some cases, less — reproach to a man than is 
right. By imputing more reproach than is fitting, the wit descends into unseemly abuse; 
by imputing less reproach than is fitting, he risks making light of that which deserves 
heavier censure than he offers. The wit must be particularly civilized and mindful of 
decorum in this perilous situation because, here, he particularly risks inadvertently 
causing pain by exceeding the mean. 
It might then seem safest to avoid telling or hearing any jokes at all. Yet 
Aristotle's discussion of the rigidly dour man, who does just this, suggests otherwise. 
The boor disassociates himself from his companions when they share laughter: he "is 
useless when he meets people in these circumstances. For he contributes nothing himself, 
and objects to everything."74 Like the quarrelsome man, he positions himself in 
opposition to his company: he is unwilling to cause pleasure by venturing to share in 
joke-telling and will cause pain by his constant objections to others' jokes. He is 
disinterested in evaluating and partaking of even the right pleasures of good companions. 
Like the boaster he also seems to claim too much for himself: by objecting to all wit he 
first suggests that he is loathe to acknowledge his own absurd foibles and, further, that no 
man can fittingly reproach him even in jest. In other words, he cannot bear to hear or 
make jokes because he knows that he might, in turn, find himself the subject of a fitting 
joke: reticent to admit his own deficiencies and fearful that the reputation he has claimed 
for himself will be revealed as false, the boor simply cannot bear to countenance this 
possibility. 
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Aristotle, however, emphasizes the particular danger attendant to vicious 
buffoonery. Here, the vicious man will not observe any bounds of decorum in the jokes 
he tells and hears, nor will he spare anyone pain if he thinks that he can raise a laugh 
thereby.75 In some respects the buffoon might seem akin to both the flatterer and 
foolishly self-deprecating person: pretending to think too little of himself he is willing to 
accept and deal out more reproach than he should under the guise of humour; being 
oversolicitous of his company's pleasure he is too free and voluble in telling jokes. If he 
has consciously disavowed the proper end of wit, the buffoon will wield humour as a 
means of indiscriminately stimulating the pleasures of others in order to profit himself: 
his foolish self-deprecation seems designed to render himself amenable to those who 
would take pleasure in his humorous self-reproach. However, if he is variable in the 
reproach he deals out — variable, that is, because he abandons the proper judgement of 
worth that must accompany true wit — the acute pain that he causes others risks revealing 
him as intransigently asocial: just as the flatterer and the avaricious boaster seek to evade 
discovery by mimicking consociational behaviour, this jester must hide the self-seeking 
nature of his actions to preserve his opportunity for profit. The buffoon's own self-
abusive behaviour might go some way toward palliating the offensive sting of his 
outwardly directed wit. He may also be aided in evading discovery by the nature of 
humour itself: because we are too readily given to taking pleasure in jokes we might all 
the more readily mistake the impertinent buffoon for the true wit. The true wit, however, 
will be particularly adept at distinguishing the buffoon's abuse from his own use of 
humour and will not be lulled into endorsing his behaviour. 
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An analysis of the characters of the friendly, truthful and witty man highlights the 
intimate and closely symbiotic relationship between these three consociational virtues. 
The virtues of civility require a high degree of interpersonal social awareness and compel 
the man of civil character to fit his manners to his company. By identifying civility as a 
virtue we lend ethical content and force to these external displays which are too often 
adjudged to be the mere artefacts of superficial convention, devoid of all ethical or moral 
import. We must now turn to an examination of the courtier's relations with others to 
explore how these might play out in the world of the court. 
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CIVILITY AND THE COURTIER 
Castiglione's interlocutors take it as axiomatic that they are, for the most part, 
discussing how the imperfect man can exercise his capacities for reason and action in an 
effort to perfect his character. Ludovico attests to the possibility of imagining men who 
are 
born endowed with such graces that they seem not to have been bora, but to have been fashioned 
by the hands of some god, and adorned with every excellence of mind and body; even as there are 
many others so inept and uncouth that we cannot but think that nature brought them into the world 
out of spite and mockery. And just as the latter for the most part, yield little fruit even with 
constant diligence and good care, so the former with little labor attain to the summit of highest 
excellence.1 
The courtier they are fashioning, however, will not be so exempt from the exigencies of 
diligence, good care and labour: we are told that because "there is a mean to be found 
between such supreme grace on the one hand and such stupid ineptitude on the other [...] 
those who are not so perfectly endowed by nature can, with care and effort, polish and in 
great part correct their natural defects." The courtier must reflect upon his deficiencies 
and consciously act to improve himself. It might seem strange, then, that the discussion 
immediately turns to an examination of the optimality of the courtier's good fortune in 
being of noble birth and beautiful countenance. Under the force of Gasparo's objections, 
Ludovico admits that these gifts of fortune have little to do with a man's character, but 
points to the importance of first impressions in the minds of those who have yet to discern 
a man's worth. Ludovico identifies the lingering effect that reputation has in insulating 
the "dull-witted and maladroit"courtier from censure and in burdening the unfortunate 
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man with the task of winning esteem. The prince's favour plays no small part in 
forming reputations: if the prince accords his favour to a man because he has been blessed 
by the vicissitudes of fortune, undiscerning courtiers will adhere to this opinion and will 
tend to overlook unworthy actions which would otherwise seem to merit disfavour.5 
Ludovico, ostensibly in defence of the merits of good fortune and public opinion, tells us 
that 
if we notice anything which seems contrary to the prevailing opinion, we suspect that we must be 
mistaken, and, and we continue to look for something hidden: because we think that such universal 
opinions must after all be founded on the truth and arise from reasonable causes. And also because 
our minds are quick to love and hate, as is seen in spectacles of combats and of games in every sort 
of contest, where the spectators often side with one of the parties without evident reason, showing 
the greatest desire that this one should win and die ouier should lose. Moreover, as for the general 
opinion concerning a man's qualities, it is good or ill repute that sways our minds at the outset to 
one of these two passions. Hence, it happens that, for the most part, we judge from love or hate.6 
Thus, the argument goes, the courtier must always be mindful of his reputation and strive 
to form a good and pleasing impression in the minds of others.7 
This discussion highlights a number of themes which underlie the interlocutors' 
formation of the courtier. First, Ludovico's exposition draws our attention to the 
difference between apparent worth and true worth, or in other words to the imperfect 
correlation between seeming and being. He first suggests that those qualities which are 
bestowed upon us by fortune do much to help create a positive impression of ourselves 
and to conceal our character in the minds of the many: a well-born and beautiful courtier 
can readily be accepted at court even if he proceeds to behave as an incompetent dimwit. 
This strict differentiation between seeming and being draws our attention to the potential 
deceptiveness of appearances and the first impressions these engender. If the many are 
ready to indiscriminately accept those happy accidents of birth as being indicative of 
63 
worth, then it is likely that they will also accept the cultivated appearance of pleasing 
beauty as being indicative of worth. Ludovico tells us that "anyone who aspires to have 
the rank and name of good Courtier must strive from the beginning to make a good 
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impression." If the courtier is blessed by fortune then he has an advantage; if he is not 
then he must yet strive to create a good and pleasing first impression. Second, 
Ludovico's discussion about the importance of reputation draws our attention to how 
good fame helps the courtier secure his esteemed status at court. The incompetent 
dimwit's good reputation allows him to capture the interest and attention of the court but 
also allows him to coast on this reputation even when his actions suggest that he ought to 
lose favour. Ludovico tells us that the many are quick to judge on the basis of their 
passions — in other words, they primarily appraise other men by referencing their 
unreflecting emotional reactions — and that reputation is that which makes the first and 
most vivid impression on these passions. Even when others find some discrepancy 
between the incompetent dimwit's good reputation and his bad actions, this will only 
cause the many to seek to resolve their cognitive dissonance in favour of his good 
reputation: if he is blessed with a good reputation then he gains an immediate advantage 
at court which, for the many, is not readily overturned through the exercise of reason. 
Third, if the prince graces a courtier with his favour then this is wont to influence popular 
opinion and to enhance a man's reputation and status at court. If the powerful prince 
bestows his favour upon an incompetent dimwit because of his fortunate birth, the many 
will tend to adhere to and adopt the prince's opinion and seek to justify it in their own 
minds. The courtier, then, ought to hope for or actively seek the favour of his prince in 
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order to gain status within the court. 
We must consider the implications of Ludovico's exposition, particularly in view 
of the interlocutors' subsequent endeavours to form a courtier who cultivates his 
appearance and seeks to win praise at court. Through his discussion of the fortunate but 
incompetent dimwit, Ludovico highlights the very real effects which reputation and 
public opinion have upon a courtier's status within the court: it is imperative that the 
courtier know how to judge others rightly. If the many can be deceived into according 
status to the incompetent dimwit by dint of his appearance and reputation, then consider 
how much better the competent and clever courtier might fare provided that he too is 
blessed with or cultivates a good appearance and fine reputation. We might be tempted to 
conclude that it is enough for Castiglione's courtier to cultivate pleasing manners and to 
win praise with the simple aim of securing his position at court. Indeed, we might 
conclude that it is imperative for the courtier to deceive others into thinking that he has 
qualities he does not possess in order to win and keep their approbation. These 
conclusions, however, are too hastily drawn. Certainly, it is necessary and useful for the 
courtier to understand how the many at court judge worth; however, it is insufficient for 
the courtier to uncritically observe and accept these reasons as his own. If the courtier 
only seeks to satisfy courtly caprices through any means available to him, then he leaves 
himself open to thinking as the many do and to being deceived in turn. The courtier, 
then, must first understand precisely how and why the many at court are self-deceived. 
The error lies not in beginning to form a first impression based upon appearance or 
reputation — nor, indeed, does it lie in attributing some value to appearance and 
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reputation. Instead, the error lies in valuing these things in the wrong way. The many 
begin by ascribing worth based upon appearance and reputation rather than upon those 
words and deeds which evince a man's character: in other words, having first formed an 
opinion of a man's worth they then decide upon that opinion and employ their reason to 
affirm rather than to test this decision. It is important to note that the many err even if a 
man's reputation and character happen to be in accord: because they seek to affirm their 
opinion rather than to understand a man's character, any correct judgment that the many 
might arrive at is specious and accidental. Further, the error does not lie in referring to 
the prince's judgment of a man's worth, but in referring to his judgment indiscriminately. 
The many heedlessly seek to be in accord with their prince without first considering if the 
prince himself is a worthy man capable of judging other men's worth. Indeed, it is much 
the same to the many whether the prince grants favour based upon an ill-conceived 
opinion or whether he bases it upon the correct valuation of a man's character: in this 
way, the many are at least as likely to begin by ascribing worth to an unworthy man as 
they are to a worthy man. Having harnessed their reason in the service of affirming their 
own opinion, the many compound their error by harnessing their reason in the service of 
affirming their prince's opinion. As before, they can only stumble into a correct 
judgement about a man's worth. Of course, the error also does not lie in loving or hating 
a man, but in loving him too hastily, too passionately and in the wrong way. Where the 
many are pleased by a courtier's appearance and reputation they will feel that a man is 
worthy of their approbation: their passions inflamed, they will tend to love a man and to 
allow their minds to be favourably swayed in his direction. If they bring their 
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subordinated reasoning faculties to bear on the matter of the courtier's worth at all, we 
can expect that it will most likely be to support and maintain the impression that their 
passions have so firmly stamped upon their minds. The many, then, tend to ascribe worth 
to a man in a slavish and extraordinarily poorly reasoned fashion. It should be noted that 
while this characterization of the many tends to debase the plurality of courtiers into men 
who seem somewhat bestial or less than fully human — and so, in this sense, this 
characterization might be considered an unrealistically exaggerated one — it might yet 
serve to illuminate many courtiers' prevailing dispositions or tendencies. It is still the 
case, then, that Castiglione's courtier must understand how the many tend to err but it is 
not fitting or sensible for him to adopt their errors in turn. 
If the courtier is to avoid being deceived or buffeted by the caprices of the court, 
he must first have the right understanding of appearances, reputation, first impressions, 
praise and worth. A man's cultivated appearance and the reputation he enjoys might 
indeed tell us something of his worth, but these things cannot be considered apart from or 
supercedent to his actions and behaviours. The courtier does not act wrongly if he begins 
to form an impression of a man based upon his appearance and his reputation: however, 
he must exercise his reason to test this first impression by examining and evaluating the 
man's chosen actions since it is these which begin to reveal his character. Appearance 
and reputation allow us to form opinions about a man, but these opinions are best 
understood as particulars which must be deliberated upon before deciding a man's worth: 
in other words, our first untested opinion of a man may compel us to deliberate upon the 
question of his worth, but we should not resolve opinion and reasoned judgment as 
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though they were one and the same. If, as we deliberate, we find that a man's actions 
accord with the opinion which precedes him, then we can say that we have come to some 
understanding about his character and his worth and, so, we can decide upon our opinion. 
The courtier will strive to come to a true understanding of a man's worth but, at the very 
least, deliberating in this way will allow him to arrive at a tested — or more-or-less-true 
— opinion of a man's worth. While it is not unreasonable to consider the opinion of 
others when deliberating upon a man's character, it is also useful to know whether these 
opinions are formed well or poorly. If, for example, a courtier's good reputation is 
confirmed by another who we know to deliberate well in these matters, then we can 
consider the opinion we receive to be a tested one. Of course, it is often the case that we 
do not know how a man has come by his reputation — that is, whether he has come by 
his reputation deservedly on the merits of his character or undeservedly on the basis of 
undiscriminating opinion. Even if we do know that the opinion or understanding we 
receive is likely to be a well-tested one, we are more certain of a man's worth if we 
observe his actions and deliberate upon his character ourselves: a trustworthy opinion 
must only serve as a part of our deliberation, even if we accord it more weight than we 
would an untrustworthy opinion. 
It is also imperative that the courtier not decide to love or hate a man on the basis 
of a passionate response that subsumes his reason to his appetite for pleasure. While the 
courtier may be pleased by another at first glance, as above he must determine the man's 
worth before he can judge whether the man is worthy of love or hate. If, for example, a 
man seems pleasant but reveals himself to be of bad character through his vicious actions, 
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it is right for the courtier to be displeased with that man. Though it is in the matter of 
appearances that first impressions can be most treacherous a man's consciously cultivated 
appearance may nevertheless reflect upon his character. Federico, for example, suggests 
that the courtier ought to be mindful of "what manner of man he wishes to be taken for, 
and dress accordingly; and see to it that his attire aid him to be so regarded even by those 
who do not hear him speak or see him do anything whatever."9 In response to Gasparo's 
objection that it is not right for a man of worth to judge a man's character by his manners 
rather than by his words and deeds, Federico acknowledges that first impressions do not 
always tell us what sort of character a man has but explains that "a man's attire is no 
slight index of the wearer's fancy, although sometimes it can be misleading; and not only 
that, but ways and manners, as well as deeds and words, are all an indication of the 
qualities of the man in whom they are seen."10 Good appearance, ways and manners, for 
Federico, are like the effects which arise from a man's chosen actions.11 If a man actively 
seeks to cultivate a pleasing appearance it may be that he displays a fitting measure of 
self-love which causes him to choose those things which duly grace his appearance and 
make it fine and that he demonstrates a fitting consciousness of making himself pleasant 
to others. Alternately, a selfish or egoistic man may also cultivate a pleasing appearance 
motivated by that vanity which takes indiscriminate pleasure in self-adornment and in the 
promiscuous praise he might win from others.12 The manner of behaviour a man adopts, 
in other words, might reveal an adherence to a fitting, virtuous civility which is conscious 
of the right pleasures of others just as it might reveal an adherence to that flattering, 
vicious incivility which only seeks to indiscriminately stir the pleasures of others. In this 
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case, manners and even appearance are not inconsequential for the courtier, but it 
becomes evident that he must test his first opinion of a man against his words and deeds 
if he is to judge a man correctly. The courtier, in the end, must know both how others 
judge wrongly and how he should judge rightly. 
This understanding of the courtier's ability to correctly judge others underpins the 
interlocutor's subsequent discussion of how he is to display his own personal qualities. 
The interlocutors' analysis of the courtier's qualities leads to a discussion of virtue that is 
bracketed by two expositions: the first on the warlike man and the second on the winsome 
man. First, Ludovico highlights the character of the warrior who cannot suit his actions 
to his situation by recalling a court lady's cutting response to one such warrior: 
We do not wish [the Courtier] to make a show of being so fierce that he is forever swaggering in 
his speech, declaring that he has wedded his cuirass, and glowering with such dour looks as we 
have often seen Berto do; for to such as these one may rightly say what in polite society a worthy 
lady jestingly said to a certain man [.. .] whom she sought to honor by inviting him to dance, and 
not only declined this but would not listen to music or take any part in the other entertainments 
offered him, but kept saying that such trifles were not his business. And when finally the lady said 
to him: "What then is your business?" he answered with a scowl: "Fighting." Whereupon the lady 
replied at once: "I should think it a good thing, now that you are not away at war or engaged in 
fighting, for you to have yourself greased all over and stowed away in a closet along with your 
battle harness, so that you won't grow any rustier than you already are"; and so, amid much 
laughter from those present, she ridiculed him in his stupid presumption.13 
If the warrior is depicted as being akin to a vicious attack dog the winsome man seems 
more akin to a dumb and fawning lap dog. Here, Ludovico addresses Bernardo's 
questions about the particulars of the courtier's countenance by telling him that it should 
have a graceful, yet manful quality about it, not 
soft and feminine as many attempt to have who not only curl their hair and pluck their eyebrows, 
but preen themselves in all those ways that the most wanton and dissolute women in the world 
adopt; and in walking, in posture, in every act, appear so tender and languid that their limbs seem 
to be on the verge of falling apart; and utter their words so limply that it seems they are about to 
expire on the spot; and the more they find themselves in the company of men of rank, the more 
they make a show of such manners. These, since nature did not make them women as they clearly 
wish to appear and be, should be treated not as good women, but as public harlots, and driven not 
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only from the courts of great lords but from the society of all noble men.14 
The apparent distinction made between the active theater of war and the quiescent theater 
of court obscures the conditions of contention and alliance which exist within the court: 
for example, we can observe that the warlike man is wounded by the court lady while 
Ludovico advocates routing the winsome man from society. However, the quickness with 
which Ludovico imagines these men being dismissed from court belies the difficulty of 
such a task. Though the warlike man evinces an overabundance of spirit and the 
winsome man a deficit of spirit, both these men are similar in that they want reasoned 
control of their appetites. The warlike man's tyrannical desire for mastery compliments 
the winsome man's slavish desire to be mastered. Their resonant natures are united 
through their respective qualities of unfettered bloodthirst and yielding lust, coarse 
aggression and beguiling enticement, brutish domination and obliging submission. These 
striking men could only resonate with the many who hastily award praise and blame and 
give their love and hate passionately and almost unreasoningly. The courtier must be 
avoid blame and win praise from the men at court, but in this case he is figured as 
consciously striking a graceful mean: he must evince his excellence in all things but 
always with well-practiced "good judgment and grace, if he would deserve that universal 
favor which is so greatly prized."15 The courtier must always be genial but must "never 
depart from comely conduct, [behaving] with that good judgment which will not allow 
him to engage in any folly."1 That the courtier deliberates about the circumstances and 
ends of his activities before choosing to engage in them does not mean that he is without 
spirit: he should be willing and able to engage in those activities which display his 
71 
"manly vigor, [such as] the hunt" and in leisure he must be able to "laugh, jest, banter, 
frolic, and dance."17 However, the courtier's primary exercise of reason allows him to 
direct, rather than to be directed by, his spirit and his appetites; in turn, he is inured to and 
free from the bestial behaviours of the warlike and the winsome man. He must first know 
how, when and why he should act to cause pleasure or pain within the court, and he must 
know who is a worthy ally and who a worthy opponent. 
Given the visceral nature of the appetites described here, we might expect that the 
virtue bracketed by these expositions would be the Aristotelian virtue of temperance. 
Strikingly, however, Gasparo and Ludovico instead discuss the Aristotelian virtue of 
truthfulness: objecting to Ludovico's suggestion that the courtier must avoid excessive 
praise of himself, Gasparo asserts that "he who feels himself to be of some worth, and 
sees that his works are ignored, is indignant that his own worth should lie buried; and he 
must make it known to someone, in order not to be cheated of the honor that is the true 
reward of virtuous toil."18 Ludovico's own somewhat indignant retort echoes Aristotle's 
discussion of truthfulness: he reiterates his point that self-praise must befit a man's worth 
and that he must not fall into the vice of boastfulness.19 Nor must he "cause annoyance or 
envy in the person who listens to him" but must achieve the difficult task of signaling his 
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own worth without seeming overanxious to do so. Having established the courtier's 
ability to rule his passions and appetites with good reason and sound judgment, 
Castiglione seems to tacitly acknowledge that the courtier will be disposed to deplore the 
impolitic qualities associated with mastery and servility. The interlocutors' discussion of 
truthfulness seems designed to point us toward a reading of these expositions in relation 
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to the virtue of civility. Having first discussed the courtier's ability to judge his company, 
Ludovico offers us examples of two men who lack this ability and who are consequently 
precluded from behaving rightly in the company of worthy men. At court, the grimacing 
warlike man seems akin to the boorish man in his indifference to the pleasures of others, 
while the languid winsome man seems akin to the flatterer in his special enthusiasm to 
subordinate himself to and please men of rank. Having both decided that their ruling 
passions are most estimable they are each quick to exceed the bounds of propriety in 
flaunting their qualities. The base warlike man makes a point of displaying his spite and 
derision toward others, while the winsome man makes a show of his meretriciousness. In 
the theater of the court, these men are remarkable for their quarrelsome and obsequious 
manners respectively and might easily strike an impression upon the readily overawed, 
plastic minds of the many who judge passionately but poorly: if the many will be inclined 
to hate the quarrelsome man they will also be inclined to love the flatterer. The courtier, 
by adopting civil manners, certainly seeks to be loved and to avoid being hated, but he 
does not seek these ends indiscriminately. 
The courtier must be guided by a reasoned understanding of himself and others 
before he can know what manners to adopt. Signor Unico refuses to list particular rules 
of etiquette to his fellow interlocutors, citing the difficulty and superfluity of the task, but 
offers examples of egregiously ill-mannered behaviour.21 Federico objects that while it 
should be easy for the courtier to avoid extremes of bad behaviour, inattention and 
especially ambition can cause a man to be blind to his own inconspicuously bad 
behaviour. Having already agreed that prudence must guide the courtier's actions, 
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Federico asserts that 
to win praise deservedly, and a good opinion on the part of all, and favor from the princes whom 
he serves, I deem it necessary for him to know how to order his whole life and how to make the 
most of his own good qualities generally in associating with all men, without exciting envy 
thereby. And how difficult this is in itself can be inferred from the rarity of those who are seen to 
reach such a goal; for, truly, we are all naturally more ready to censure errors than to praise things 
well done; and many men, from a kind of innate malice, and even when they clearly see the good, 
strive with all effort and care to discover some fault or at least something that seems a fault.23 
Discretion is decided to be the better part of prudence and Federico asserts that the 
courtier must take careful stock of himself as well as his company in order to know how 
to present himself: "let him consider well what he does or says, the place where he does 
it, in whose presence, its timeliness, the reason for doing it, his own age, his profession, 
the end at which he aims and the means by which he can reach it."24 Before we turn to an 
analysis of how the courtier might avoid unfitting censure, we must consider how he is to 
win right praise and seek to avoid right censure. The courtier must be ever mindful that 
"it is wrong to seek false glory or what is not deserved, [even as he knows that it is] 
wrong also to rob oneself of a deserved honor and not to seek that praise which alone is 
the true reward of virtuous labors." The courtier ought to seek praise for the qualities he 
has mastered however, we are told that because complete perfection 
is very rarely, and perhaps never, found in human nature, a man who feels himself wanting in some 
particular ought not to lose confidence in himself or the hope of reaching a high mark, even though 
he cannot attain to that perfect and highest excellence to which he aspires. For in every art there 
are many ranks besides the highest that are praise-worthy, and he who aims at the summit will 
seldom fail to mount more than half the way. Therefore if our Courtier knows himself to be 
excellent in something besides arms I would have him with propriety derive profit and honor from 
it: and let him have the discretion and good judgment to know how to bring people adroitly and 
opportunely see and hear what he considers himself to excel in. [. . .] And in everything that he 
has to do or say, let him, if possible, always come prepared and ready, but give the appearance that 
all is done on the spur of the moment. But, as for those things in which he feels himself to be 
mediocre, let him touch on them in passing, without dwelling much upon them, though in such a 
way as to cause others to think that he knows much more about them than he lays claim to know [.. 
.] Then, in those tilings wherein he knows himself to be totally ignorant, I would never have him 
claim ability in any way or seek to gain fame by them, when need be, let him confess openly that 
he knows nothing.26 
74 
As we might imagine, Federico is pressed hard by the disquieted interlocutors for 
appearing to form a courtier who, in matters where he has imperfect knowledge, makes 
the categorically deceitful distinction between seeming and being. 
The ever-sceptical Gasparo observes that Federico seems to suddenly be lauding 
vice, and that his vision of the courtier has departed egregiously from the praiseworthy 
virtue of truthfulness in order to enter into "an actual deceit."27 Having already asserted 
that, above all, he wishes the courtier to highlight the talents that he does have and to 
deemphasize or admit to those that he simply does not,28 Federico deals with the 
troublesome issue of having the courtier touch lightly upon those things that he knows 
only moderately well while imparting the suggestion that he knows them better than he 
claims to. Federico is somewhat half-hearted in his response to Gasparo's accusation, 
saying that he does not think that this is deceit but that, if Gasparo insists upon calling it 
this, he does not think it is much one to be blamed.29 Here Federico seems to tacitly 
consider that the courtier, when he is inescapably pressed to hold forth in those areas in 
which he has imperfect understanding, might be compelled to deviate from the virtue of 
truthfulness — perhaps even erring in the direction of boasting for praise by careful, quiet 
omission. The courtier's own ethos prevents him from explicitly claiming those qualities 
which he does not have, but when he is pressed his quiet omission regarding those skills 
he has knowledge of but has yet to master in full might seem to go beyond the avoidance 
of extravagant self-depreciation and to encroach upon less-than-virtuous territory. 
We must recall, however, that the imperfect courtier is a creature who is always in 
the process of coming-to-be; as Federico suggests, the courtier is rightly oriented toward 
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virtue and to doing good actions and understands that he must always strive to achieve 
greater excellence. In this case, if he seeks praise for talents he cannot yet claim to 
possess in full he still keeps the proper end of truthfulness in sight — that is, he does not 
lose sight of the fact that praise rightly earned is the proper end of truthfulness. He is also 
fully aware of his own shortcomings and always acts with the understanding that he must 
strive to transform himself into that which seems most praiseworthy to him: he does this, 
as we recall, by observing men of different professions and by "conducting himself with 
that good judgment which must always be his guide, [to] go about choosing now this 
thing from one and that from another [. . .] taking from each the part that seems most 
worthy of praise."30 Ultimately, his efforts are directed towards transforming himself into 
the several excellent men he learns from by practicing and incorporating their excellent 
qualities until they are natural to him.31 If it is improbable that he will fully attain this 
goal, he always seeks to come as near to it as is humanly possible. Though in some 
instances the courtier seems to prematurely imply that he might possess certain talents 
which he has yet to master, we cannot imagine that he does so with an utter lack of 
scruples or hoping to win indiscriminate praise with the aim of achieving material gain 
as, for example, the boaster for profit will do. The courtier does not seek praise at any 
cost but seeks to be praised for cultivating his own excellence and for choosing good 
actions. Unlike the boaster for profit he will not be indifferent to his deficiencies, 
thinking that so long as he achieves an effect it is of no consequence whether or not he 
possesses the qualities that he claims; instead he will recognize his deficiencies as lapses 
which ought to be corrected but whose partial lack should not be counted too strongly 
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against him in the interim. The praise he values most highly, then, must come from those 
who value excellence and good actions similarly: in other words, he primarily seeks to 
win the esteem of other good men at court. If the courtier errs in the direction of boasting 
for praise, these good men will have the right understanding of the courtier's actions: they 
will praise him for the excellent qualities that he does have and if they will not praise him 
for those which he prematurely claims they will also understand why he does not deserve 
the same censure that the flatterer or the boaster for profit deserves. Indeed, since we 
must assume that these equally worthy men will be similarly imperfect we can also 
assume that they, more than anyone, will understand the quality of the courtier's claims 
for himself and why this must be distinguished from unscrupulous and base viciousness. 
We might also suspect that they, rather than simply censuring the courtier, might be 
inclined to help him achieve a better command of that quality he wishes to master but 
finds himself only moderately well in command of. Over time his right orientation and 
good actions will lead him closer to more fully being that which he seems to be rather 
than farther away from it: in other words, he will always tend toward achieving 
excellence rather than toward descending into baseness. If he is to be blamed at all, then, 
Federico is right to suggest that he is not to be blamed much. 
Of course, we cannot dismiss the effect that the courtier's quiet implication will 
have on the many. While a decorous display of excellence can win the admiration and 
perhaps the love of the many, the suggestion that the courtier is even partially deficient in 
some area might just as easily sway those capricious minds to derision and perhaps even 
hatred. Of course, the courtier primarily avoids this unreasoning hatred by emphasizing 
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his excellence and deemphasizing his deficiencies but, in some cases, he also avoids it by 
quietly suggesting he has a greater command in some particular area than he has yet to 
achieve. This implication, of course, can only help the courtier to avoid the unreasoning 
derision of the capricious many even as it suggests his worthy aims to the discriminating 
men at court. However the many, unlike the more discriminating, would likely tend to be 
unable or unwilling to understand the quality of the imperfect courtier's implicit claims 
for himself and should they discover the disunion they might think themselves 
categorically deceived: in their passionate overeagerness to deride the courtier, the 
censure they might be inclined to deliver could only be disproportionate to the ostensible 
offense. Further, their censure — rather than being delivered in the spirit of correction or 
of prompting the courtier to ameliorate his condition and increase his command in some 
area — would tend to be delivered in the simple spirit of denigration. In this way, it is 
conceivable that the best but imperfect courtier would stand improperly accused and 
unduly reviled in the eyes of the many. In this case, discretion demands that the courtier 
recognize this probability and insulate himself from the undue and malign censure of the 
immoderate many. 
Moderation, of course, must factor into the courtier's display of his own talents: 
as Federico's exposition reminds us the courtier must not only achieve the difficult effect 
of making his own talent manifest and emphasizing his own skill, but he must do so 
without exciting envy or resentment thereby. Federico suggests that the completed 
Courtier will be the object of wonder but that he will marvel at no one, before promptly 
averring that the courtier ought not to be possessed of a "proud and inhuman rigidity, 
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such as some have who refuse to show any wonder at all at what others do, because they 
think they are able to do much better, and by their silence scorn those things as unworthy 
of mention; and act as if they wished to show that no one is their equal, let alone able to 
understand the profundity of their knowledge."32 In fact, we can imagine that the rare 
completed Courtier, in his perfect excellence, might be justified in adopting the very mien 
of disdain which Federico seems to disavow: Federico's qualification, however, helps us 
to apprehend the proper mien that the incomplete courtier ought to adopt when he makes 
his own particular excellences manifest. It is both fitting and prudent that the civil 
courtier not accompany a display of his own talent with the suggestion of derision or with 
the suggestion of an overweening desire for praise. Since the courtier is neither 
quarrelsome nor fawning any display of his skill must be calculated to win approval 
without paining those who witness it (by haughtily and boorishly presuming to suggest 
their own lack) and without demanding that they take too much pleasure in it (by 
presuming to suggest his matchless superiority). When the courtier is in the company of 
men of similar worth, it is not fitting that he adopt a mien meant to connote his own 
superiority and his companions' inferiority — and this is so even if he finds that he excels 
in one skill (for example, horsemanship) and his audience excels in a motley of different 
skills (poetry or archery, for example). He seeks to win his fellows' fitting favour and 
applause for his particular talents, not their complete submission: his excellent command 
of one or more skills does not imply that he ascends above his companions either in terms 
of general skill or general worth. Consequently, he ought to learn to "praise the good 
achievements of others with kindness and good will" just as he would wish to be praised 
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for his own good achievements. Most of all the courtier seems to be concerned with 
fostering good will between himself and men of equal worth, but we must also be mindful 
of the effect that the courtier's decorous display of skill will have on the many. The 
courtier's display of his own talents must be calculated to please even those spectators 
who might be possessed of lesser skill or worth, and a moderate and well-mannered 
display of these talents can go far towards obviating the envy which might be aroused in 
the many. In particular, the many might be inclined to denigrate the courtier in his 
shining moments if the courtier's excellence is displayed in a way that makes them feel 
their own lack too acutely: if he is to remain a pleasant object of wonder, then, the 
courtier must concentrate his focus on being decorously graceful and moderate in the 
praise he accepts and attributes to himself while remaining unobtrusively reserved on the 
matter of his audience's skill or worth. 
That said, the courtier does not only or even primarily seek to maintain the favour 
of the many at court. Federico describes the effect that the goodwill generated by 
virtuous civility can have and suggests that relationships between courtiers are of 
particular importance because they are "more universally the case, and a man finds 
himself more often engaged with such company than with princes."34 He begins by 
distinguishing the courtier and the flatterer's relationships with others, describing 
flatterers as 
fools, who, even if they are in the company of the best friend in the world, upon meeting with 
someone better dressed, attach themselves at once to him; and then, if they happen on someone 
even better dressed, they do the same again. And if the prince should pass through the square, 
church, or other public place, then they elbow their way past everyone until they stand beside him; 
and even if they have nothing to say to him, they insist on talking, and hold forth at great length, 
laughing and clapping their hands and slapping their heads to make a show of having important 
business, so that the crowd may see that they are in favor. But since such as these deign to speak 
only with princes, I would not have us speak of them.35 
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While the flatterer is extraordinarily variable in his aim to be in the company of the most 
conspicuously esteemed or powerful man at court, it is quite likely that he will generate 
some measure of goodwill amongst the many at court. Aristotle reminds us that "because 
the many love honor they seem to prefer being loved to loving. That is why they love 
flatterers. For the flatterer is a friend in an inferior position, or [rather] pretends to be 
one, and pretends to love more than he is loved; and being loved seems close to being 
honored, which the many certainly pursue."36 Though transient and variable in his 
attentions, the flatterer's excessively and indiscriminately pleasing words and deeds may 
be enough to form a positive impression upon the passionate minds of undiscerning 
courtiers. Feeling themselves to be loved, the many are readily willing to accept the 
flatterer's pleasing words and deeds at face value. Further, this first impression might be 
difficult to overturn: even though the flatterer's pleasing mien is countered by his less-
than-pleasing tendency to abandon his current companion when better prospects appear 
on the horizon, the many, as we recall, tend to overlook these things in an effort to 
confirm their passionate first impressions. The discerning courtier, however, cannot feel 
goodwill toward the flatterer whose inconstancy belies his overriding, egoistic self-love 
and his indiscriminate profit-seeking nature. It is not coincidental that the flatterer's 
pleasing ministrations are most closely directed at the prince: given the flatterer's aim, he 
can only gravitate toward the man most able to accord him the profit he seeks and he can 
only view other courtiers as competitors for the prince's favours. At all times, the 
flatterer tacitly establishes himself as a rival to other men and seeks to vanquish them by 
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placing himself in the first position at court: he is particularly pernicious because, while 
his overriding, egoistic desire for profit causes him to begin and end by setting himself 
against all men, he also attempts to smooth the rough edges of his self-serving behaviour 
by adopting overbearingly pleasing manners which many might be inclined to mistake for 
truly civil behaviour. 
The courtier's pleasing manners, in contrast, are directed toward better ends: his 
agreeable and affable manners are chosen with the aim of developing the sort of 
conscious and reciprocated goodwill which Aristotle describes as characterizing 
friendship. Aristotle tells us that it is base people who will be friends for utility or 
pleasure alone, but that true friends will be friends because of each one's love for the 
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other's goodness. The courtier seems to aim at that sort of complete friendship which 
occurs between good people, where each loves the other, desires to spend his days with 
the other, and wishes the other good for the other's own sake.39 The friendship of virtue, 
we are told, is the most reliable, enduring and free from slander and distrust40 and is 
characterized by 
Equality and similarity, and above all the similarity of those who are similar in being virtuous. [• . 
.] For virtuous people are enduringly [virtuous] in their own right, and enduring [friends] to each 
other. They neither request nor provide assistance that requires base actions, but, you might even 
say, prevent this. For it is proper to good people to avoid error themselves and not permit it in 
their friends. Vicious people, by contrast have no firmness, since they do not even remain similar 
to what they were. They become friends for a short time, enjoying each other's vice. Useful or 
pleasant friends, however, last longer, for as long as they supply each other with pleasures or 
benefits.41 
The complete friendship, however, seems to be an extraordinary good for the courtier to 
achieve in practice: it requires both an exclusive and intense mutual love and a deep 
familiarity with one another which must be developed over a significant period of time.42 
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Indeed, Gasparo in particular mistrusts the possibility of forming complete friendships 
with others, citing "malice or envy or inconstancy or some other evil motive" as those 
things which make it impossible for men to love each other as they ought.43 Federico 
acknowledges the difficulty of achieving complete friendship with another courtier, 
saying: 
I should wish our Courtier to have one special and cordial friend, of the sort we described, if 
possible; and then, that he should love, honor and respect all others according to their worth and 
merits, and seek always to associate more with those who enjoy high esteem, are noble, and known 
to be good men, than with the ignoble and those of little worth; in such a way that he too may be 
loved and esteemed by such men. And he will succeed in this if he is courteous, humane, 
generous, affable, and gentle in his associations with others, active and diligent in serving and 
caring for the welfare and honor of his friends, whether they are absent or present, tolerating their 
natural and bearable defects, without breaking with them for some trivial reason, and correcting in 
himself such defects as are in kindness pointed out to him; never putting himself before others in 
seeking the first and most honored places; nor doing as some who appear to hold the world in 
scorn and insist on laying down the law to everyone with a certain tiresome severity; and who, 
besides being contentious in every little thing at the wrong time, blame their friends for what they 
do not do themselves; and are always seeking a pretext to complain of them — which is a most 
odious thing.44 
In many ways, the qualities which Federico claims for the courtier's friendship with all 
other men resonates with the qualities we might find in a complete friendship of virtue. 
In this case, even if he does not achieve complete friendship, the courtier should aim 
towards this goal in his relationships and seek to foster concord between himself and 
other men of equal worth. Gasparo's objection reminds us of the distrust which can 
underlie court relations: certainly, the courtier's well-mannered displays — with their 
effect of pleasing without being so overbearing that they excite pain — go far towards 
generating goodwill and mitigating distrust and envy on the part of the many. In the case 
of friendship, however, it is not only that the courtier seems to avoid seeking a position of 
dominance but that he actually does avoid seeking dominance. It is neither fitting nor 
prudent for the courtier to seek a position of power over men of similar virtue, reason and 
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aims, rendering them rivals to be vanquished rather than friends to be consulted. As good 
but imperfect men of diverse talents and skills it is right that they praise each others' 
particular excellence and preserve each others' reputations and that they avoid harsh and 
scornful censure of one another in their imperfections as though they wished to decimate 
one another rather than help one another improve. More importantly, because these 
courtiers are imperfect in their knowledge but judge well of reputation and worth, they 
can best judge when and why they must cause pleasure or pain, to whom and in what way 
together: as Aristotle reminds us, "those in their prime need friends to do fine actions; for 
'when two go together...,' they are more capable of understanding and acting."45 
Knowing themselves to be political agents who can decide and act well, they can only 
view the flatterer's fawning and submissive profit-seeking as that which undercuts the 
political viability of courtiership in general and of good courtiers in particular. These 
courtiers are useful political agents, not only because of the particular skills they possess, 
but because of their ability to prudently exercise these skills: if courtiership is rendered 
nothing more than place-seeking and servility to the prince, then these men's political 
talents are squandered. It is fitting, then, that the courtiers seek to achieve political 
dominance over the slavish flatterer: the flatterer is a particular rival to the courtiers — 
both within the court and vis-a-vis the prince — because he least of all is inclined or fitted 
to use the favour or reputation he wins for good political ends. Yet the flatterer is just as 
likely as the courtier to win favour and reputation amongst the many at court: he is also 
just as or more likely to come into the presence of the prince given his unmitigated place-
seeking actions. Though the flatterer's success in winning the prince's favour is to some 
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degree dependent upon the nature of the prince himself, it is also true that his favourable 
but unmerited reputation at court can only help him in achieving his goals. 
The courtier, then, must seek to discredit the flatterer and reveal him as the 
unworthy man that he is. While it is preferable for the courtier to ensure that the flatterer 
does not earn the court's esteem in the first place it is also possible for him to discredit 
the flatterer after he has won favour. Bringing an already favoured man into disfavour is 
a dangerous course of action for the courtier to undertake, however: if he is matter-of-fact 
in his derision he is both unlikely to be taken seriously by the many who have already 
decided to overlook the flatterer's bad actions and he is likely to be taken for a tiresome 
boor and an unpleasant, haranguing prosecutor. He must also be careful not to impute 
blame to those who favour the flatterer, and in this he must be careful to limit the scope 
of his abuse. Wit is a particularly effective way to deliver censure within the court, since 
it offers the possibility of combining the pleasures associated with laughter as well as the 
pain which accompany fitting censure. Bernardo Bibbiena leads the interlocutors through 
a lengthy discussion of the correct aims and modes of wit and asserts that the courtier, as 
always, must consider his actions well: 
If the Courtier, with his banter and witticisms, has regard for time, person, and his own rank, and 
takes care not to use them too often (for it proves really tedious to persist in this all day long, 
unseasonably, and in every discussion, he may be called a humorous man: and if he takes care also 
not to be so sharp and biting that he be known as malicious and as one who attacks without cause 
or with evident rancor either those who are very powerful, which is imprudent; .or those who are 
weak, which is cruel; or those who are too wicked, which is useless; or says things that offend 
persons whom he would not wish to offend, which is ignorance. For there are some who feel 
bound to speak and attack indiscriminately whenever diey can and regardless of what may come of 
it.46 
We can assume that the courtier will not act from ignorance and offend other worthy men 
with his wit — or if he does inadvertently err in the direction of buffoonery we can expect 
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that he will correct himself once his error becomes apparent to him. However, he must 
tread carefully when he deliberately uses his wit to censure: most of all, Bernardo tells us, 
"it is proper to ridicule and laugh at the vices of those who are neither so wretched as 
excite compassion, nor so wicked as to seem to deserve capital punishment, nor of so 
great a station that their wrath could do us much harm." The courtier, first of all, must 
limit the scope of his censure to the man who most deserves it: the many, though they are 
blamable in favouring the flatter, seem most like the weak in their often unthinking 
rashness. It is both fitting and prudent, then, that the courtier censure the flatterer without 
seeming to impute scorn or blame to those who might favour him. The vicious flatterer 
seems to fit Bernardo's criteria most of all and so to establish himself as a proper target 
for the courtier's actions: the flatterer is favoured by the many but does not seem to 
arouse a pitying sort of compassion, so provided that censure is delivered in a pleasing 
way the minds of the many may be swayed to hatred without great dissonance. Provided 
the flatterer is not so egregiously corrupt in his place-seeking that he graduates from 
patent impropriety to the sort of viciousness that might justly condemn him to death, his 
actions do not warrant the more direct response of assassination. And though the flatterer 
may hold great sway at court, he is not so much more highly-ranked than the courtier that 
the courtier is precluded from delivering censure and keeping himself from harm at the 
same time. 
Indeed, the courtier seems well positioned vis-a-vis the flatterer in this respect: the 
courtier will not be subject to serious censure since his good reputation will be confirmed 
by that which he says and does, while the flatterer's own actions offer ample opportunity 
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for humorous censure. This, of course, does not mean that the flatterer will not retaliate 
by heaping undeserved abuse upon the courtier: in fact, it is likely that the courtier might 
find himself the subject of the flatterer's vengeful, unfitting censure. Bernardo touches 
upon this and related issues when he shares the instructive story of the chess-playing 
Portuguese monkey.48 He begins by telling the interlocutors that "the story I want to tell 
you is not so clever, however it is a good one,"49 and, indeed, it contains a number of 
cautionary messages. In this anecdote, the enraged gentleman bluntly and viciously 
abuses the monkey upon his defeat: this suggests that when a courtier undertakes to win a 
game of strategy against a passionate and unworthy opponent he must also be ready to 
defend against the most outrageous abuses. Whether the monkey appeals to the king 
piece or to the King proper for justice,50 both remain silent on the matter: this suggests 
that the courtier cannot rely upon having recourse to the prince for his defense. Indeed, 
since it is the king piece that the gentleman manipulates to abuse the monkey, we can 
infer that the courtier faces particular danger from having the wrathful flatterer seek 
revenge through the person of the manipulable, and especially the tyrannical, prince. He 
must, therefore, be mindful of both the flatterer and his prince when he undertakes to 
defeat the former. That the monkey achieves victory by mating the king with his pawn 
while simultaneously overturning the gentleman and defending himself implies that the 
courtier must be able to achieve victory even from a position of relative disadvantage or 
weakness, and that he must do so while dexterously negotiating and avoiding a number of 
traps. The image of the masterful closing pawn mate calls to mind an opposing image of 
the sacrificial opening pawn gambit whose success relies upon fortune as much as skill. 
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Indeed, given the dangerous nature of the game, the courtier must have a strong command 
of the skill of joke-telling and he must not be content to leave anything to fortune. 
However, if the courtier is dexterous enough in his wit, he might turn even the 
most disadvantageous situation to his benefit. Bernardo tells the interlocutors that 
It is delightful too when a man is given a jibe in the very thing in which he first jibed his fellow. 
As in the case of messer Alonso Carillo who, being at the Spanish court and having committed 
some trifling youthful errors, was put in prison by the King's order and left there overnight. The 
following day he was taken out; whereupon he went to the palace in the morning and came into the 
hall where there were many cavaliers and ladies. And as they laughed about his imprisonment, 
signora Boadilla said: "Signor Alonso, I feel very sorry about this misadventure of yours, because 
all who know you thought that the King was going to have you hanged." Then Alonso said 
quickly: "Madam, I too was much afraid of that; but then I had hope that you would ask my hand 
in marriage." You see how sharp and witty this one was, because in Spain (as in many other places 
also) it is a custom that when a man is led to the gallows, his life is spared if a public courtesan 
asks to marry him.51 
Even under the most adverse and tyrannical circumstances, the adept courtier will be able 
to deliver censure if he is sufficiently dexterous in his wit. It is notable, however, that the 
tyrant is not described as being present to witness Alonso's barb. We might wonder if 
this banter would have taken place in the presence of the tyrant who might be averse to 
having his serious sanction made light of. If the exchange had occurred in the presence of 
the tyrant, however, Alonso seems to have come away from it better. Boadilla's taunt, 
though clearly ironic, centers upon making a jest of the tyrant's power to mete out life and 
death: this power is perhaps the most sacrosanct to the tyrant himself, since it is that 
which best preserves bis ability to maintain mastery over his subjects. The mere 
suggestion that this power could be treated lightly as the impetus for a joke might be 
unpleasant to him. Alonso, however, first responds by suggesting his earnest fear of this 
power — thereby avoiding the suspicion that he thinks little of the tyrant's power — and 
then by scorning his abuser. Even the temporarily disgraced courtier standing in the 
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presence of his tyrant might deliver a direct blow without suffering backfire or afflicting 
collateral damage. Indeed, Bernardo suggests the possibility of using the flatterer's own 
abuses against him in the prince's presence when he says: 
among other witticisms, those are very well turned that are made by taking the very words and 
sense of another man's jibe and turning them against him, piercing him with his own weapons as 
when a litigant, to whom his adversary had said in the judge's presence: 'Why do you bark so?' 
replied at once: 'Because I see a thief.'52 
The advisability of this course of action is left to the courtier's discretion: however, in 
delivering any humorous censure the courtier must be mindful of the effect he seeks to 
achieve. If the prince is more beneficent than not, he will more readily come to be 
disabused of any notion that the flatterer has earned his reputation; the beneficent prince 
is likely to understand or be brought to understand the merit of the courtier's accusation 
and to react to the flatterer with disfavour. If the prince is more tyrannical than not then 
he, like the passionate many, might be carefully convinced to turn from loving to 
ridiculing and deriding the flatterer. In this case, it is the pleasure the tyrant takes from 
the courtier's careful witticism and the flatterer's disgrace which can first sway the 
capricious tyrant's mind, rather than any particular understanding of the merit of the 
courtier's accusation. 
The courtier's adherence to civility and his cultivation of decorous manners, then, 
allows him to negotiate a myriad of court relationships. Since he is able to judge of his 
own and others' manners and characters he is able to correctly and prudently measure his 
own words and deeds and to secure his reputation and some measure of general favour 
within the court. He is also able to discover and cultivate particular friendships and to 
uncover antagonists in a way that allows him to negotiate threats to himself and the 
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endeavour of courtiership as a whole. The courtier, however, is still left with the pressing 
task of deciding how to negotiate his relationship to his prince: here, as before, the 
courtier must appraise the quality of his prince's character before deciding how he should 
present himself to his prince and what role he should adopt within the court. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CIVIL COURTIER AND THE PRINCE 
The courtier, it must be recalled, operates within a court system where the 
character of his prince plays a significant part in determining how the court and the 
territory he rules will be governed. The courtier does not seek to instantiate a regime but, 
rather, to negotiate and influence the regime in which he finds himself. Here, Aristotle's 
preliminary observation in his discussion of the genesis, maintenance and reform of 
political regimes is salient: 
One ought to introduce an arrangement of such a sort that they will easily be persuaded and be able 
to participate in it [by the fact that it arises directly] out of those that exist, since to reform a regime 
is no less a task than to institute one from the beginning, just as unlearning something is no less a 
task than learning it from the beginning. Hence in addition to what has been said the political 
expert should be able to assist existing regimes as well [. . .] So the variety of regimes —- how 
many there are and in how many ways they are combined — should not be overlooked. And it is 
with this same prudence that one should try to see both what laws are best and what are fitting for 
each of the regimes. For laws should be enacted — and all are in fact enacted — with a view to 
the regimes, and not regimes with a view to the laws.1 
As a political agent, the prudent courtier must govern himself with an eye to the nature of 
the regime he occupies; if he cannot afford to be innocent of the his fellow courtiers' 
diverse characters, he must be just as diligent in appraising the character of his prince. 
The courtier's role and the actions he chooses to undertake will vary with respect to the 
possibility of achieving his goals within a monarchical regime and with respect to the 
nature of that monarchical regime. 
Early in their discussions, Castiglione's interlocutors debate the sort of manners 
the courtier ought to adopt in the presence of their prince. Predictably, Federico asserts 
that the courtier ought to be particularly mindful of behaving with pleasing grace in his 
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prince's company, but he also goes on to suggest that the courtier should seek to love his 
prince in the spirit of friendship.2 Federico hints at the possibility of equality in 
conversation between courtiers and their prince, but this must be understood with an eye 
to the interlocutor's subsequent discussion of the formation and character of the good 
prince. In his analysis of friendship, Aristotle reiterates his understanding that 
though admittedly, as we have said, an excellent person is both pleasant and useful, he does not 
become a friend to a superior [in power or position] unless the superior is also superior in virtue; 
otherwise, he does not reach proportionate equality by having a proportionate superior. And this 
superiority both in power and in virtue is not often found.4 
Though the interlocutors will come to address this scepticism about discovering an 
excellent and politically powerful prince who understands the quality of good rule, 
Federico first wishes to explore the quality and aim of the courtier's good manners in 
relation to his prince. He suggests to the company that "in addition to making it evident 
at all times and to all persons that he is as worthy as we have said, I would also have the 
Courtier devote all his thought and strength of spirit to loving and almost adoring the 
prince he serves above all else, devoting his every desire and habit and manner to 
pleasing him."5 Presented with this argument, Pietro da Napoli cannot restrain himself 
and hastily interjects that Federico has managed to imagine nothing more than a "noble 
flatterer."6 Federico takes umbrage at this accusation and uses the opportunity to 
circumscribe the limits of the courtier's pleasing manners asserting that "it is possible [for 
the courtier] to obey and further the wishes of the one he serves without adulation, 
because by wishes I mean such as are reasonable and right, or those which in themselves 
are neither good nor bad."7 While the courtier must be willing to amiably acclimate 
himself to his prince's reasonable pleasures with good humour and grace, Federico is also 
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careful to say that the courtier must strike a mean between taciturn boorishness and 
slavish flattery: 
[the Courtier] will not be obstinate and contentious, as are some who seem to delight only in being 
troublesome and obnoxious like flies, and who make a profession of contradicting everybody, 
spitefully and indiscriminately. He will not be an idle or lying babbler not a boaster or inept 
flatterer, but will be modest and reserved, observing always (and especially in public) the 
reverence and respect that befit a servant in relation to his master; and he will not behave like 
many who, when they meet a great prince (and even if they have spoken to him only once before), 
go up to him with a certain smiling and friendly countenance, as if they meant to embrace an equal 
or show favour to an inferior.8 
Further, though it is fitting that the courtier should desire and accept favours from his 
prince, he should not be so overinvested in these that he becomes like those self-
interested flatterers who seem as though 
they would die if they did not get [favors] and if they chance to meet with any disfavor, or if they 
see others favored, they suffer such agony that they are quite unable to conceal their envy. [. . .] 
Then again, if they happen to be favored beyond the ordinary, they are so inebriated thereby that 
they are paralyzed with joy, and seem not to know what to do with their hands and feet, and can 
hardly keep from calling the whole company to come and see and congratulate them as though for 
something they were never accustomed to receive before.9 
In contrast, the courtier must be sure that favours are offered voluntarily, received with 
modest aplomb and, above all, that they are well-deserved.10 Certainly, the courtier 
endeavours to foster goodwill, to avoid causing irritation or resentment and to win his 
prince's favour but, as Federico reminds his fellows, the flatterer's unctuously pleasing 
manners and his overeager place-seeking are capable of causing vexation in themselves: 
the flatterer's fawning and self-congratulatory displays, as well as his obstreperous 
disregard for propriety, might finally make him "the laughingstock of everyone and 
[cause his master] to favor anyone at all, merely in order to spite [him]."11 If the flatterer 
is particularly obstreperous in his efforts to be pleasing, then he might bring about the 
very opposite of the result he seeks to effect. 
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Considering that Federico's espousal of modesty takes place in conjunction with a 
discussion of the flatterer's mode of behaviour, it might be read as a lesson in how to 
become a more shrewd and subtle flatterer — that is, he might be understood as advising 
courtiers to temper otherwise promiscuously pleasing behaviour with modesty in order to 
avoid falling prey to the flatterer's most egregiously impolitic errors. However, 
Federico's discussion of judicious modesty suggests that this quality ought to accompany 
the words and deeds of any worthy man who seeks to avoid excesses of pride and 
pusillanimity: by behaving with modesty the courtier avoids becoming like those "who 
stand so aloof that they shun human society too much, and so far exceed a certain mean 
that they cause themselves to be regarded either as too timid or too proud." Modesty is a 
quality that accompanies the actions of the consociational courtier; as a man worthy of 
esteem it is right that he seek recognition from his prince and not fall prey to self-
deprecating and self-defeating pusillanimity, but in evincing his own excellence he must 
avoid the excessive presumptuousness which comes from a lack of modesty and the 
excessive haughtiness which comes from an inordinately excessive modesty that is "so 
dry and arid as to amount to boorishness."13 Certainly, a proper sense of modesty helps 
the courtier to behave with fitting propriety in the presence of his prince. The courtier 
must not only demonstrate a proper regard for himself but a proper regard for the prince 
and his station as the head of the body politic: both fawning overfamiliarity bred of 
presumptuousness and querulous boorishness bred of haughtiness serve to signal a 
courtier's own egoistic conceit and his depreciation of the prince. Modesty is a part of 
the courtier's endeavour to make himself agreeable to his prince but, lest we forget, 
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Federico reminds us that the courtier must "above all [. . .] hold to what is good [and 
never] bring himself to seek grace or favor by resorting to foul means or evil practices." 
In this sense, modesty is a quality which accompanies the courtier's rightly chosen 
actions, not that which tempers promiscuously pleasing behaviour. 
When the interlocutors' discussion resumes on the fourth and final evening, 
Ottaviano takes the opportunity to describe how the courtier may be brought to 
completion. While he attests to the praiseworthiness of the pleasing qualities so far 
ascribed to the courtier, Ottaviano argues that if these qualities are cultivated without an 
eye to their political ends the courtier risks being rendered effete. He insists that if 
the Courtier were to bring forth no other fruit than to be what he is, I should not judge it right for a 
man to devote so much study and labor to acquiring this perfection of Courtiership as anyone must 
do who wishes to acquire it. Nay, I should say that many of those accomplishments that have been 
attributed to him (such as dancing, merrymaking, singing, and playing) were frivolities and vanities 
and, in a man of any rank, deserving of blame rather than of praise; for these elegances of dress, 
devices, mottoes, and other such things as pertain to women and love (although many will think the 
contrary), often serve merely to make spirits effeminate, to corrupt youtii, and to lead it to a 
dissolute life. [. . .] But if the activities of the Courtier are directed to the good end which they 
ought to be directed, and which I have in mind, I feel certain that they are not only not harmful or 
vain, but most useful and deserving of infinite praise.15 
Ottaviano's singular focus on the political ends of the courtier's pleasing manners 
compels him to argue that the civil courtier ought to win the favour of his prince in order 
to help educate him and direct him toward right political action: the courtier will make 
use of his "readiness of wit, charm, prudence, knowledge of letters and of many other 
things" in order to persuade the prince to act in accord with "justice, liberality, 
magnanimity, gentleness, and the other virtues that befit a good prince."16 However, 
Ottaviano does not linger long upon these assertions before he turns to a discussion of the 
perniciousness and corrosive influence of the flatterer within the court. He paints the 
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courtier as a friend to even the most ignorant and egoistic prince, while the flatterer is 
rendered the prince's enemy.17 The sort of friendship that the courtier can engage in with 
his prince will be shown to vary according to the character of that prince, but Ottaviano's 
immediate purpose is to describe the dangers of allowing the flatterer to win influence at 
court. His animosity toward the flatterer is revealed to be partially fueled by the tight 
competition amongst courtiers to win the prince's ear. More important than this, 
however, is the flatterer's vicious impetus for action and the possibility of the prince's 
receptiveness to the flatterer's ministrations: since the indiscriminate tyrant in particular 
is best able and suited to satisfy the flatterer's appetites, all that remains for the flatterer to 
do is to manipulate his prince's will so that he may profit thereby. This, Ottaviano 
argues, is accomplished through means of falsehood and deception: 
from friends these men become flatterers, and, to gain profit from their close association, always 
speak and act in order to please, and for the most part make their way by dint of lies that beget 
ignorance in the prince's mind, not only of outward things but of himself; and this may be said to 
be the greatest and most monstrous falsehood of all, for an ignorant mind deceives itself and 
inwardly lies to itself.19 
The flatterer, then, is figured as a corrupting influence who can lead the prince to exercise 
his power in the service of his own indiscriminate appetites and, by extension, the 
appetites of those who most please him. If the prince is primarily surrounded and 
influenced by flatterers then, at the very least, he will be sorely tempted to descend into 
tyranny: once the prince is encouraged to loose himself from those moorings of "duty and 
honor" that help preserve good governance, he all the more readily descends into 
licentious rule and the sort of autarchic despotism which precludes the courtier from 
exercising any real measure of political agency.20 Ottaviano, then, is probably quite 
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sincere when he insists that 
there is no punishment atrocious and cruel enough for those wicked courtiers who direct gentle and 
charming manners and good qualities of character to an evil end, namely to their own profit, and 
who thereby seek their prince's favor in order to corrupt him, turn him from the path of virtue, and 
bring him to vice; for such as these may be said to contaminate with a deadly poison, not a single 
cup from which one man alone must drink, but the public fountain that is used by all the people.21 
Since the flatterer's conspicuous display of servility is best matched to the tyrant's 
inflated conception of himself, it is imperative that the good courtier undermine the 
flatterer's influence within the court. The flatterer, who can go further in pleasing the 
tyrannical prince than even the most well-mannered and pleasing courtier, reinforces the 
tyrant's lawlessness even as he himself seeks to profit from it. If the courtier fails to set 
himself to the task of undermining the parasitic flatterer, then he risks losing all influence 
with his prince and all political agency within the court: at the very least, if he is not 
driven from court, he risks being forced into a position of servile obedience himself. 
Good and prudent courtiers must not only know how to keep enemies from their 
prince but must also understand how to achieve favour and make use of their favoured 
position to effect their regime. Since the prince is a conspicuously powerful figure within 
any court, it is imperative that the prince learn the art of governing well lest he abuse bis 
power and destabilize — or perhaps destroy — his regime bringing all other men down 
with him. Though Ottaviano lauds good princely rule as a salutary and natural political 
state of affairs, for the republican Bembo the aforementioned danger is evidence for the 
intrinsic superiority of republican rule: he puts forth the argument that it is dangerous to 
accord power to one man who can too easily be lead into abusing his power and echoes 
Aristotle in his assertion that 
it seems that since liberty has been given us by God as a supreme gift, it is not reasonable that it 
should be taken away from us, or that one man should have a larger portion of it than another: 
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which happens under the rule of princes, who for the most part hold their subjects in the closest 
bondage. But in well-ordered republics, this liberty is fully preserved: besides which, both in 
judging and deliberating, one man's opinion happens more often to be wrong than the opinion of 
many men; because the disturbance that arises from anger or indignation or lust more easily enters 
the mind of one man than that of the many, who are like a great body of water, which is less 
subject to corruption than a small body.22 
For Bembo, a well-ordered republic represents the best possible regime within which 
reasoning political agents might operate without fear of or danger from tyranny: only in a 
republic, he insists, is there the possibility of political action characterized by "true and 
equal liberty, when those who sometimes command obey in their turn."23 He goes on to 
say that in order for the prince to rule justly he would necessarily have to be of an 
improbable quasidivine, superhuman nature.24 It is striking that Bembo's unabashedly 
republican argument is made within a court setting: the intrinsic danger he ascribes to 
princely rule seems to be somewhat obviated by his fearless willingness to openly 
propound the merits of republicanism against monarchism in open court. Bembo's 
galvanizing argument, with its explicit threat to the right of princely claim to rule, can 
only pique the attention of his companions and the Duchess who governs their game. 
However, there can be no doubt amongst the interlocutors that Ottaviano — who has 
already explicitly positioned himself as favouring monarchy — will act as the defender of 
princely prerogative: Bembo's brash republican argument is a threat which is certain to 
meet with the possibility of reprieve in Ottaviano's counterargument. 
Ottaviano begins by reviewing Aristotle's notion of right and deviant 
constitutions and identifies the good prince as one whose rule is not "absolute and 
violent, like that of masters toward their slaves, [but is] more mild and gentle, like that of 
good princes over the citizens by means of laws."25 Gasparo presses Ottaviano to 
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describe how the reasonable men should be ruled by a prince, and Ottaviano's reply 
reveals his own doubts about the possibilities of discovering a perfectly beneficent or 
magnanimous prince: no more than the courtier does the prince spring fully-formed from 
the ether; instead he must be "aided by the teachings and the training and skill of so 
prudent and good a Courtier as [the interlocutors] have devised, [so that] he will be very 
just, continent, temperate, strong, and wise, full of liberality, magnificence, religion and 
clemency."26 Here we should observe that the prudent prince is not described as being 
perfectly virtuous or magnanimous, but as being continent in the extreme: in light of this 
mitigated understanding of the good prince's character, Ottaviano's suggestion that the 
prince he describes will ascend to quasidivine status has the scent of cautionary tale about 
it. Ottaviano goes on to say that the even if the Prince is found to be "not of another 
species higher than the human" the ministrations of a good courtier might help incline 
him toward excellence: it is only by the grace of God, however, that "he will attain the 
heroic virtue that will bring him to surpass the limits of humanity and be called a 
demigod rather than a mortal man."27 If the imperfect but meritorious prince comes to 
think of himself as being supremely virtuous, he will tend to exceed the bounds of his 
mandate and consider it fitting that he rule with absolute authority: not unlike the tyrant, 
he will fall prey to excessive egoism and consider it right that he monopolize authority 
and power. If the worthy courtier, who is similarly imperfect but oriented toward virtue, is 
reduced to obeying the prince in absolute terms then he has unjustly been reduced to 
being ruled without having the opportunity to rule in turn. 
The courtier must not only make use of his pleasing manners to win the prince's 
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favour and orient him to virtue and good rule, but must do so in a way which allows him 
to understand how he can first preserve and then govern his principality. To preserve his 
rule a prince must ultimately allow himself to be drawn toward the devolution of power 
which Aristotle describes as preserving monarchies: "the fewer things over which [kings] 
have authority," we are told "the greater the period of time their rule as a whole will 
necessarily last: they themselves are less like masters and more equal in their characters 
and less envied by those who rule."28 In this vein, at the Duchess' prompting, Ottaviano 
at last spells out his optimal regime: 
I should teach [the prince . . .] that he should choose among his subjects a number of the noblest 
and wisest gentlemen, with whom to consult on everything, and that he should give them authority 
and free leave to speak their mind to him about all things without hesitation; and that he should act 
toward them in such a way as to show them all that he wished to know the truth in everything and 
that he detested falsehood. And, besides such a council of nobles, I should advise that from among 
the people other men of lower station should be chosen who would constitute a popular council to 
confer with the council of nobles concerning the affairs of the city, both public and private. And in 
this way there would be made of the prince (as of the head) and of the nobles and the people (as of 
the members) a single united body, the government of which would depend chiefly on the prince, 
and yet would also include the others; and such a state would thus have the form of three good 
kinds of government, which are monarchy, optimates, and people.29 
Ottaviano warns that the prince who aspires to the sort of absolute mastery which is only 
merited by a quasidivine ruler will come to be hated and will create the conditions which 
foster "seditions, conspiracies, and a thousand other evils."30 The bestial, licentious 
tyrant, however, will also be hated for his inability to conform to, enact and enforce stable 
laws. Notably, Ottaviano's own defense of monarchical regimes is not without it's own 
cautionary import: it is infused with Ottaviano's own warning against adopting a mode of 
governance characterized by heavy-handed autarchical mastery and by his cataloguing of 
dissolute tyrants who have lead a life of distress and insecurity by cultivating the enmity 
of their citizens.32 If the prince wishes to preserve his regime he must avoid these 
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extremes and instead exercise human prudence in "maintaining with all men a strict 
equality in certain things, such as justice and liberty; and in certain other things, a 
reasonable inequality, such as in being generous, in rewarding, in distributing honors and 
dignities according to differences in [men's] merits." The prince's reward for authority 
well-exercised is not only peace of mind or ineffable praise and honour, but the 
preservation of his own fitting prerogative and profit within the principality. As a worthy 
man and reasoning political agent, the courtier also seeks to win for himself a fitting 
measure of power, honour and profit and, under the right conditions, courtiers might win 
these things in a well-ordered principality. The prince's good governance in distributing 
offices, honours and profits will address the matter of equality in justice and liberty: no 
part of the principality will be without claim or opportunity to rule in its own way, and no 
part of the city will want for honour or profit if their merit supports their ambition. While 
Bembo is not incorrect in his assertion that courtiers might win political agency in a well-
ordered republic he is too quick to abandon the prince as a lost cause; Ottaviano's reply 
suggests that the courtier might also effectively influence and participate in the princely 
regime in which he finds himself. Further, though Bembo's republican threat carries with 
it the connotation of revolution and regime change — his exposition on the merits of 
republicanism considers both why republican rule is the best in an absolute sense and why 
it is superior to princely rule particularly — there is no certainty that this sort of upheaval 
would result in the well-ordered republic Bembo envisions. If the courtier can achieve 
his political ends without having to undertake the significant risks and dangers attendant 
to revolution and regime change, then he would be imprudent to seek to overturn the 
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principality without first attempting to serve, strengthen and preserve it. 
The courtier's role in ministering to his prince is to a significant degree 
dependent upon the character of the prince himself. If the courtier comes into the service 
of a prince who is already well-educated and who has established a largely stable and 
viable principality then, Ottaviano says, it is enough for the courtier as minister and 
optimate to serve his prince in a way that helps preserve the regime: worthy courtiers, in 
this case, will be mindful of offering such counsel as is required to preserve the 
distribution of power and offices and of undermining either overambitious flatterers or 
slanderers in their attempt corrupt and destabilize the regime.34 Though good courtiers 
will make themselves friendly to their prince, perhaps entering into the sort of rare 
political friendship Aristotle describes, they will not exceed the bounds of propriety or of 
their own offices in offering counsel or in seeking to rule: if courtier and prince are to 
achieve their mutual goal of good governance of the principality then the courtier, no less 
than the prince, must allow for the finitude of his own part in deciding and ruling. This 
suggests that the political relationship between courtier and prince must be mediated by a 
sort of mutual adherence to a pleasingly civil political deliberation which communicates 
their felicitous welcome and respect of each other when undertaking to effect their shared 
aim of preserving the principality: the courtier ought to behave in a way which positively 
acknowledges the prince's particular role in exercising power in accordance with his best 
understanding of good political action and the prince, in turn, ought to behave in a way 
which positively acknowledges the courtier's particular role in refining the prince's 
understanding of good political action. 
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Before the evening's end, however, Elisabetta expresses her concern with 
Ottaviano's description of the worthy courtier as occasional preceptor and suggests that if 
the courtier is qualified and inclined to educate a prince, he might also consider himself 
qualified and inclined to become a prince himself.35 Guiliano supports Elisabetta's 
contention and openly accuses Ottaviano saying that "the Courtier, through whose 
instruction the prince is to become so excellent, would have to be more excellent than the 
prince; and, in this way he would also be of greater dignity than the prince himself, which 
is most unseemly."36 Giuliano goes on to suggest that the stable principality Ottaviano 
describes can only be viable if the prince and his courtiers are sufficiently close in 
understanding and worth: otherwise, their aims will be so disparate that they will be at 
crosspurposes and the possibility of good governance, as Ottaviano describes it, will be 
unfeasible. The conversation is once again galvanized by Elisabetta's insecurity and the 
deftness with which Giuliano stokes this insecurity. Indeed, all things being equal the 
worthy courtier seems to have little incentive to delay deposing a less worthy prince and 
assuming his role; the interlocutors, however, are not prepared to advocate this hasty 
course of action. Ottaviano's reply, as before, offers the possibility of reprieve from this 
threat but is as much contingent upon the prince's receptiveness to the courtier's efforts 
as it is upon the courtier's efforts themselves. Ottaviano asserts that the viability of a 
principality depends upon the condition of the prince's character: 
I will say that I did not hold that the Courtier's instructions should be the sole cause of making the 
prince such as we would have him be, For if the prince were not by nature inclined and fitted to be 
so, every care and every exhortation on the part of the Courtier would be in vain: even as the labor 
of any good husbandman would also be in vain if he were to set about cultivating and sowing the 
sterile sand of the sea with excellent seed, because such sterility is natural to it; but when to good 
seed in fertile soil, and to mildness of atmosphere and seasonable rains, there is added also the 
diligence of man's cultivation, abundant crops are always seen to grow in plenty there. Not that 
the husbandman alone is the cause of these, although without him all the other things would avail 
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little or nothing. Thus, there are many princes who would be good if their minds were properly 
cultivated; and it is of these that I speak, not of those who are like sterile ground, and are by nature 
so alien to good behavior that no training can avail to lead their minds in the straight path.38 
If the courtier finds himself in the service of a worthy prince who is sufficiently inclined 
towards continence, good governance and, ultimately, towards entering into friendly 
relations with men of worth, then it is not only prudent but also fitting that the courtier 
adopt a pleasing and friendly manner with him. The possible danger, of course, is that the 
courtier will encounter a prince whose conceits and experiences with power will find him 
more incontinent and autarchically-minded than continent and civically-minded. This in 
itself, however, is not enough to render the prince an irremediable tyrant nor is it enough 
to warrant an attempt by worthy courtiers to usurp the prince; if the prince is found to be 
incontinent but not inveterately resistant to education and correction, the courtier might 
still impress upon him the dangers to his principality and the ways in which he might 
improve and preserve it. Though this prince cannot properly be characterized as being 
absolutely tyrannical, his inclination toward tyrannical rule suggests that the courtier must 
consider the political possibilities associated with the reform of a tyrannical regime. 
Aristotle conceives of two methods of preserving a tyranny, insofar as this is possible: the 
first and least agreeable to courtiers' ends depends upon entrenching the tyranny by 
having it conform absolutely to the despotic rule39 and the second depends upon having 
the tyranny conform more closely to a civic kingship.40 As a result of the latter, Aristotle 
tells us, 
not only will [the tyrant's] rule be nobler and more enviable by the fact that he rules over persons 
who are better and have not been humbled and does so without being hated and feared, but his rule 
will also be longer lasting; further, in terms of character he will either be in a state that is fine in 
relation to virtue or he will be half-decent—not vicious but half-vicious*1 
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The distinction Aristotle makes between these king-like rulers' characters is important: if 
the prince who is found incontinent proves to be an apt or willing pupil he can 
conceivably become rehabituated and be brought to enact better governance. In other 
words, the reeducated, more continent prince will become more princely and not only 
seem to be princely and stand in better relation to virtue; the reformed principality, in this 
case, will not merely be a veneer which covers its essentially tyrannical nature. If the 
courtier comes into the service of an educable but incontinent prince, his pleasing 
manners are displayed in order to both 
seek to gain the good will and captivate the mind of his prince that he may have free and sure 
access to speak to him of anything whatever without giving annoyance [. . .] and also, little by 
little, to inform his prince's mind with goodness, and teach him continence, fortitude, justice and 
temperance, bringing him to taste how much sweetness lies hidden beneath the slight bitterness that 
is at first tasted by anyone who struggles against his vices; which are always noxious and offensive 
and attended by infamy and blame, just as the virtues are beneficial, smiling and full of praise.42 
The courtier does not seek to win the good will of the true tyrant any more than he 
attempts to win the goodwill of the flatterer; but it is worth cultivating the goodwill of the 
prince who is capable of being educated and brought to good governance. Certainly, 
when the worthy courtier is called upon to serve a profligate prince, we cannot say that he 
will enter into the sort of friendship of equals that he might enjoy with another prince 
who is better inclined toward virtue: the courtier can only judge the incontinent prince to 
be in a more blameworthy condition than himself and in need of that correction which the 
courtier can provide. However, if the incontinent prince proves to be capable of being 
taught to execute better governance of himself and his principality, then it is fitting that 
the courtier be friendly towards this prince and make himself amenable to sharing in and 
praising those of the prince's pleasures that are worthy or do not exceed the bounds of 
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decency. 
It is in the character of the incontinent prince, however, to be just as or more 
inclined to blameworthy rather than praiseworthy actions: the well-mannered courtier 
must be prepared to address the prince's blameworthy actions, but he must be prudent in 
delivering censure. In his efforts to educate the incontinent prince, the courtier will first 
strive to keep his mind 
occupied with worthy pleasures, yet always impressing upon him also some virtuous habit along 
with these enticements, [beguiling the prince] with salutary deception; like shrewd doctors who 
often spread the edge of the cup with some sweet cordial when they wish to give a bitter-tasting 
medicine to sick and over-delicate children.43 
The quality of this ostensible deception, however, bears consideration: in order to educate 
his prince, the courtier will never say less than he ought to help persuade his prince to 
orient himself towards virtue, but he will be mindful to avoid earning the prince's 
displeasure or ire and to avoid antagonising the prince and worsening his condition. 
Friendliness, as we recall, requires us to occasion pleasure and pain in the right way and 
in accordance with a particular aim. The courtier who is friendly to his prince and 
devoted to improving the principality will begin by adopting pleasing manners in the 
presence of a ruler who is primarily prompted to action by his appetite for pleasure. If the 
prince receives the courtier's pleasing manners and his solicitousness of the prince's 
pleasure as evidence that the courtier is as invested in pleasure for pleasure's sake as he 
himself is, then in this he is more self-deceived than misled by the courtier. In his 
argument for habituation to virtue and vice, Ottaviano describes the process of educating 
the child to rule and exercise his natural capacities and appetites well: "first," we are told 
"we are able to see, hear, and touch, then we do see, hear, and touch, although many of 
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these activities are improved by discipline. Wherefore good masters teach children not 
only letters, but also good and seemly manners in eating, drinking, speaking, and walking 
with appropriate gestures."44 It is necessary for the prince who is more given than not to 
the childlike trait of being led by his appetites to be educated by a master who, "by his 
teaching and good reminders," will both implicitly and explicitly evoke the qualities of 
character he seeks to help develop in his prince.45 By behaving with pleasing grace from 
the first, the courtier not only makes himself genial to the prince but renders himself an 
immediate "good reminder" of how worthy men engage in their pleasures with one 
another: from exemplifying and teaching the pleasantness of the virtues of civility, the 
courtier might also begin to guide the prince to those other virtues which will ameliorate 
his condition and his rule. 
If the courtier is to be effective in his role as preceptor to the prince, however, he 
must be able to offer reminders of how unworthy men take their pleasures and highlight 
the undesirability of these actions. In delivering censure, however, the courtier must 
skillfully highlight the personally and politically detrimental nature of blameworthy 
actions by indirectly arousing and then more directly allaying the prince's solicitousness 
of his own comfort and well-being. For Ottaviano, the key to choosing to act with greater 
continence is a true, clear recognition and understanding of those things which are 
detrimental to our person.46 Given the incontinent prince's character, however, it is 
difficult to imagine that the courtier might begin by appealing too directly to his reason 
and understanding to persuade him of the detrimental nature of his behaviour: though the 
remediable prince is figured as having some sense of how his actions are detrimental to 
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himself and his rule — there is, in other words, some struggle between his reason and his 
appetites and passions — his habitual inclination to yield to his appetites at first renders 
him ill-prepared to receive a strong appeal to his reason. In his efforts to educate his 
prince, the courtier will offer friendly encouragement designed to persuade the prince to 
emulate the example of famously lauded, worthy men47 but will also venture to keep the 
cautionary image of the distressful and ignominious life of the tyrant before his prince's 
eyes. Ottaviano's own defense of good princely rule — appended as it is by detailed 
cautionary examples of hated tyrants who lived private lives beleaguered by perpetual 
discomfort and unease — offers the prince the means and incentive to choose good 
actions but also a disincentive to choose poor ones. While the courtier delivers tangible 
pleasure to the incontinent prince, he also refers him to the prospect of living a life whose 
pleasures are always diluted by disease and fear. When the indirect cautionary example of 
the tyrant offered by the courtier is made ancillary to his own directly pleasing and 
friendly demeanour, the consequences it imputes to the incontinent prince's own 
blameworthy behaviour takes on the cast of friendly rather than menacing cautionary 
advice: in other words, the courtier indirectly exposes the prince to the prospect of 
danger should he choose to pursue tyrannical actions without seeming to be a potential 
cause or source of this danger. The courtier who begins by approaching his prince in the 
spirit of friendliness, who is primarily solicitous of engaging in his prince's worthy 
pleasures and indirect in his censure of his prince's unworthy ones, and who offers the 
prince a viable and appealing alternative to tyrannical rule might all the sooner render his 
prince receptive to the ethically and politically valuable instruction and advice he offers 
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both as preceptor and advisor. 
When discussing the limits of the courtier's duties to his prince, however 
Castiglione's interlocutors raise the specter of the irremediable tyrant. Though the tyrant 
who is so committed to his own depravity that he can rarely, if ever, be moved by the 
most diligent ministrations of the courtier may represent the rare case, he is still a 
consideration for the interlocutors. The tyrant who reveals himself to be unwilling or 
incapable of learning and of incrementally bringing himself to gain an understanding of 
and adopt responsibility for his own character and governance can never support a stable 
and viable principality. At best, courtiers who seek to educate the inveterate tyrant and 
improve his regime might meet with sporadic success but they will find themselves 
engaged in a perpetual, white-knuckled form of governance which, from moment to 
moment, threatens to regress back into absolute or near-absolute tyranny. Of course, if 
the courtier is merely content to remain with the tyrant and earn what profit he can within 
the regime, he is reduced to slavish obedience and commits an act of treachery towards 
himself and the principality: that is, he allows himself to abandon his prerogative as a 
political agent and to become a servile instrument of the tyrant who manages nothing 
more than to enforce and deepen the regime's lawlessness. The quality of the worthy 
courtier's actions when he finds himself in the service of a tyrant must shift significantly, 
then. On this topic, Ottaviano reminds his companions that 
Plato taught Dion of Syracuse, and later, when he found the tyrant Dionysius like a book full of 
defects and errors and in need of complete erasure rather than of any change or correction (since it 
was not possible to remove from him that color of tyranny with which he had been stained for so 
long), he decided not to make use of the methods of Courtiership with him, judging that they 
would all be in vain; which is what our Courtier ought also to do if he chances to find himself in 
the service of a prince of so evil a nature as to be inveterate in vice, like consumptives in their 
sickness; for in that case he ought to escape from such bondage in order not to incur blame for his 
prince's evil deeds and not to feel the affliction which all good men feel who serve the wicked.48 
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Ottaviano leaves the question of exactly how the courtier ought to escape the tyrant's 
bondage open to evaluation. Earlier in Book II, Vincenzio Calmeta asserts that the 
courtier's greatest misfortune lies in beginning to serve an inveterately malevolent prince 
in the first place since it becomes difficult for him to quit the service of a tyrant without 
bringing blame and dishonour upon himself.49 Federico avers that the courtier ought to 
be solicitous of his own reputation even when he is in the service of an inveterately bad 
prince and affirms that the courtier must not act in any way that might bring blame or 
dishonour to himself: for worthy courtiers who find themselves in the service of a bad 
prince 
duty should come before all other considerations. And provided a gentleman does not leave his 
lord when he is at war or in adversity — for it could be thought that he did so to improve his own 
fortunes or because he feared that his chances for profit had failed him — in any other time I think 
he has a right to quit, and ought to quit, a service which in the eyes of all good men is sure to 
disgrace him.50 
Given that the tyrant, as Ottaviano reminds us, is always in a position of adversity either 
at home or abroad the courtier seems caught in a quandary: the provision Federico spells 
out seems an unlikely, if not impossible, one. In effecting his duty, then, the courtier is 
faced with the difficult, seemingly impossible options of remaining in the service of the 
tyrant while retaining his reputation or of abandoning him without damaging his 
reputation. 
Should the courtier opt to remain in the service of the tyrant he might, with his 
conspicuous display of pleasing manners, position himself well within the tyrannical 
court. The tyrant, Aristotle tells us, 
[must guard] against anything that customarily gives rise to two things, high thoughts and trust. 
Leisured discussions are not allowed, or other meetings connected with leisure, but everything is 
done to make all as ignorant of one another as possible, since knowledge tends to create trust of 
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one another. Also, residents [of the city] are made to be always in evidence and pass their time 
about the doors [of the tyrant's palace]; in this way their activities would escape notice least of all, 
and they would become habituated to having small thoughts through always acting like slaves. [. . 
.] Also [a feature of tyranny is] to slander them to one another, and set friends at odds with friends, 
the people with the notables, and the wealthy with themselves.51 
First, regardless of the tyrant's intent, the courtier's pleasing ways and manners might 
help him to win the goodwill of other good men and allow him to foster trusting and 
relatively high-minded friendships with those who are able to correctly judge the content 
and meaning of his actions. In the eyes of the undiscerning tyrant who tends to judge in 
the same way as the many, however, the courtier's attention to pleasing ways and 
manners might suggest a sort of frivolous small-mindedness and preoccupation with 
pleasure for pleasure's sake which obscures the threat that the courtier presents to his 
rule; the self-deceived tyrant will not tend to distinguish the courtier from the slavish and 
inconstant flatterer who is wantonly solicitous of his ruler's pleasures and fickle in his 
friendships. Kingship, Aristotle tells us, "is preserved by friends [of the king], but it is 
characteristic of the tyrant to distrust his friends, on the assumption that all wish to 
overthrow him], but these are particularly capable of it."52 While the prince is figured as 
profiting from his close association with and politic treatment of good courtiers, the 
tyrants Ottaviano describes are figured as foundering under the weight of their own 
actions and bringing themselves and men of worth to a dangerous state by pursuing the 
typically paranoid tyrannical politics of "recklessly [persecuting] the good and the wise 
and [exalting] the wicked; [allowing] no friendships in their cities nor unions nor 
understandings among the citizens [and] sowing discord to keep men disunited and 
weak." If the courtier discovers himself to be in the service of an irremediably 
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tyrannical prince, then he and his fellows will soon come to understand that their ends are 
not to educate or serve but to undermine and destroy: through a combination of the 
courtiers' friendly and pleasing behaviour and the tyrant's poor judgment of this 
behaviour, worthy men at court might find themselves in a relatively safe position, free 
from the tyrant's suspicions, to achieve their ends. 
However, if the courtier chooses to remain in the court of the inveterate tyrant 
the quality of the advice he offers will have to accord with the character of his ruler: 
having found the tyrant to be immovable and utterly resistant to undertaking the policies 
associated with good kingship, he is left to make use of any favour he wins to advise the 
tyrant in the ways he might strengthen his regime by bringing it to conform more closely 
with absolute despotism. By serving in this capacity, however, the courtier exposes 
himself to a considerable risk: in actively advising and encouraging the tyrant to 
undertake the actions which will ultimately impoverish his rule and hasten his own 
demise, the courtier risks becoming too closely associated with the hated tyrant. While 
fellow courtiers will be unlikely to impute blame to him and might even aid him in this 
course of action — that is, they will tend to understand that this advice is offered in the 
spirit of undermining and hastening the downfall of the tyrannical regime — the subtlety 
of the courtier's actions might be lost on the many. If the courtier is seen as complicit in 
encouraging the tyrant's policies, then he might become favoured by the tyrant but 
vicariously hated by those who would seek to enact the tyrant's downfall and, by 
extension, the seemingly complicit courtier's as well. 
On the other hand, if the courtier opts to abandon the service of the tyrant, 
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leaving him to founder under the weight of his own ineradicable vice and corruption, men 
of worth are likely to understand that his actions are not motivated by cowardice or profit-
seeking inconstancy but by the impossibility of the courtier's task in attempting to 
ameliorate and preserve the regime by rehabilitating the tyrant. While the many are more 
likely to suspect that fear and greed are indeed the motives which compel the courtier to 
leave the tyrant's service, it is unlikely that they will assign blame, properly speaking, to 
the courtier — if anything they might relate to and sympathize with the motives they 
assume compels his actions. Even then, however, if the many are inclined to voice their 
assumption that the courtier escapes the tyrant because he is simply motivated by 
mercenary inconstancy, his reputation with other men of worth — and so his immediate 
political prospects at any court he escapes to — might be negatively affected: if other men 
of worth receive the newly-arrived courtier as a man who is suspected of being motivated 
simply by self-interested inconstancy, then the courtier will begin by being on less sure 
footing with his peers at any new court. While this might not prove an insurmountable 
barrier to achieving influence in a new court under a less vicious prince, it will present 
some measure of difficulty. Though the courtier will bring himself and his actions be 
understood by other men of worth who will come to judge his actions in a positive light, 
he might be aided in this endeavour by his association with those fellow courtiers he has 
previously formed a friendship with. As friends, these courtiers will be solicitous of his 
reputation and will seek to persuade others that no blame is rightly imputed to him for 
abandoning the irremediable tyrant. Any prince the courtier escapes to, however, might 
be less inclined to forgive the courtier for his ostensible inconstancy in abandoning his 
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service to the tyrant: the prince, no less than the abandoned tyrant himself, might suspect 
the courtier of treachery proper. Though, from the courtier's perspective, entering into 
the service of almost any prince is preferable to remaining in the service of the inveterate 
tyrant Castiglione's interlocutors seem to suggest that not just any port will do in a storm. 
While the courtier ought to always seek to enter the service of a prince who governs well 
in times of peace — that is, of a prince who is more inclined to good governance and less 
to tyranny — it behoves him to serve a man who directs his military passions to the 
destruction of tyranny.54 If the courtier is to best serve the principality he flees, he should 
make himself friendly to and enter into the active service of the tyrant's most worthy 
enemy: whether this man begins as a prince or aspires to the rulership of the tyrant's 
principality he, more than any other man, might be inclined to welcome the courtier if it is 
made apparent that they share the mutual aim of effecting the tyrant's downfall. By 
directing his efforts to raise a new prince, who he might then enter into a fruitful political 
relationship with, the courtier effectively remains loyal to his principality by ameliorating 
its condition and reenters political life with the improved potential to engage in fruitful 
political action. 
The courtiers' pleasing manners in relation to their prince, then, help to create 
the conditions which will allow them to preserve, strengthen or undermine a principality. 
Should courtiers find themselves in the service of a prince who acts as good governor, 
then their pleasing manners will facilitate their political relations with this prince. Should 
they find themselves in the service of a redeemable prince, the goodwill that their 
pleasing manners earn them will allow them to help reform and stabilize his rule and, in 
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turn, to ensure their own political prerogative. Should they find themselves in the service 
of the rare irremediable tyrant, however, they will find themselves left with the task of 
undermining the regime so that it might give rise to a better-governed and more 
politically propitious principality. 
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CONCLUSION 
Castiglione's advocacy of pleasing ways and manners seems designed to help 
courtiers become conscientious men of goodwill who, in their social and political 
interactions, are mindful of adopting a gracious mien in the company of others. While the 
civil courtier ought to become well-practiced in the pleasing behaviour that renders him 
welcome and genial to his company, he is precluded from allowing his actions to be 
governed by an indiscriminately thoughtless or empty desire to ingratiate himself to other 
men at court. The courtier is compelled to deliberate upon his own qualities and the 
quality of his fellows before deciding how he should govern himself in the company of 
others. The courtier must guard against indulging in the severe, haranguing and perhaps 
abusive behaviour of the boorish man whose actions betray a thorough disregard for the 
right pleasures, opinions and human dignity of others in his community. At the same 
time, in acknowledging and being solicitous of the right pleasures, opinions and dignity 
of his fellows, the courtier must guard against descending into the sort of indiscriminate 
excesses of adulation that characterize the servile flatterer's manners. The courtier must 
be ever-mindful of striking a right and fitting mean in his consociational behaviour. 
Given the myriad of diverse men who compose the court, however, it seems 
almost unavoidable that the quality of the courtier's civil behaviour will vary from person 
to person and from circumstance to circumstance. While the courtier begins by striving 
to make himself genial to his company in general, over time his acumen will help him to 
form closer bonds of friendship with estimable men of equal worth, to maintain amiable 
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relations with most others, and to distance himself from the most irremediably blamable 
men at court. Friendliness is a virtue whose intermediate mean is closer to one vicious 
extreme than the other1: because friendliness seems more akin to flattery, the distinction 
between the courtier's preference to "share pleasure and avoid causing pain" and the 
flatterer's indiscriminate oversolicitousness of other men's pleasures might too readily be 
obscured. If the courtier prefers to share in the pleasures of others he is no less limited 
and discerning in his praise than he is in his censure: the courtiers' good manners — 
bounded as they are by those considerations of "the fine and the expedient"3 which are 
foreign to the flatterer — must be exercised when offering both. Consequently, the 
courtier's good manners are not only "good" in the sense that they consider the pleasures 
of others but in the sense that they reflect a measured understanding of the right ways to 
appeal to the pleasures as well as the pains of others. His attention to the right ways of 
causing pleasure and pain does not merely reflect an adherence to a hollow form of 
etiquette that depreciates and adorns the truth for the pleasures of base men. The civil 
courtier does not abandon a consideration of others' pleasures even when he is in the 
company of his most worthy and familiar friends, where some might suppose him to 
engage in an abstracted form of austere, ratiocinative speech: as Federico reminds us, the 
courtier's closest friendships with men of equal worth and capacity for reason will be 
characterized by a pleasing mutual felicity which is "courteous, humane, generous, 
affable and gentle" and even when these friends have occasion to correct one another they 
will do so "in kindness" never belabouring trivial errors or descending into "scorn" or 
"tiresome severity."4 The courtier is never freed from the ethical exigencies of civility: 
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when entering into social and political intercourse with other fully-constituted human 
beings, he must always undertake an intercatenated consideration of their capacity for 
pleasure as well as their capacity for reason and demonstrate that he is solicitous of and 
values both. 
Nevertheless, in considering how he must negotiate the pleasures and pains of 
others, it becomes apparent that the quality of the courtier's appeal will vary, particularly 
when he finds himself facing the possibility of offering correction or delivering censure. 
To some degree, the particular dilemma facing the courtier when he decides if and how he 
ought to cause pain by objecting to something that "is not fine, or harmful"5 comes about 
as a result of the nature of friendliness itself. Since the civil courtier will be more 
inclined to share pleasure than to cause pain it might be that when he encounters errors 
that are slight, casually incurred or incidental to his immediate aims he is correct to avoid 
causing pain by passing them over in silence. On one hand, the overpunctilious, explicit 
elaboration of every lapse or flaw in another's words and deeds might be considered right 
— and so justified — according to some stringent and abstracted conception of truth 
which sees no error as more or less ponderous or worthy of remark than any other; 
however, by belabouring every error with equal fervour the civil courtier seems to 
abandon any reference to that which is fine or beneficial for human life. When venturing 
to offer positive censure, the courtier ought to be "guided by the consequences [he 
foresees for his actions so that] to secure greater pleasure in the future he will cause slight 
pain."6 In some cases, then, causing even slight pain by choosing to remark upon the 
error of another's actions might be an incommensurate and purposeless response to that 
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lapse in view of the foreseeable consequences. It is inescapable, however, that the 
directness or indirectness of the courtier's positive censure is influenced by his appraisal 
of the possibilities of having this censure effectively received: if, after considering the 
aims and consequences of his actions, the courtier thinks it necessary to deliver censure 
but anticipates that he will be discredited or become the subject of undue opprobrium in 
response, then he will behave judiciously by rendering his censure indirect. It is here that 
the quality of dissimulation may begin to enter into the courtier's civil actions: if the 
particular character of his audience compels him to adopt a passively defensive posture or 
to obscure an actively offensive one then, even as he remains committed to delivering 
censure, he will seek to deliver it obliquely. The designation of this indirection as 
"deception" is questionable, however: the courtier will never say less than he is ethically 
compelled to or simply avoid causing pain when this action is called for — at the very 
least, to do this would defeat any practical or edifying effect that his necessary censure 
might have — but in order to ensure that the censure he offers is received he will tailor it 
to the immediate capacities of his audience. 
Castiglione's imperative that the courtier should endeavour to cultivate a pleasing 
and effortless grace in his social and political actions is not constituted by a frivolous 
adherence to form, an ethical barrenness or the advocacy of wholesale deceit: instead, 
civility is that which guides his decisions about how, when and to what end he should 
cause pleasure or pain when entering into social and political intercourse with other men. 
The courtier must be able to correctly appraise himself and others while also being able to 
understand how others appraise and receive him in turn. By cultivating his own civility, 
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the courtier is able to negotiate a myriad of different relationships with other courtiers and 
the prince he serves and he is more readily able to preserve and exercise his own political 
prerogative and positively influence the court he finds himself in. 
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1. The closeness of the virtue of friendliness to the vice of flattery seems to reside in the nature of the virtue 
itself. Aristotle tells us that when, "in some cases the deficiency, in others the excess is more opposed to the 
intermediate condition," it is occasionally because of 
the object itself. Since sometimes one extreme is closer and more similar to the intermediate 
condition, we oppose the contrary extreme, more than this closer one, to the intermediate 
condition. Since rashness, for instance, seems to be closer and more similar to bravery, and 
cowardice less similar, we oppose cowardice, more than rashness, to bravery; for what is further 
from the intermediate condition seems to be more contrary to it. This then, is one reason, derived 
from the object itself. (28 [1109al-13]) 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., trans Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999). 
2. Ibid.,63[H27a4-6]. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Baldesar Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans. Charles Singleton, ed. Daniel Javitch (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2002), 92. 
5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 63 [1126b31]. 
6. Ibid., [1127a5-6]. 
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